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This study investigates whether independent directors’ expertise in the industry in 
which the firm operates improves board functioning. To assess the quality of board 
functioning, I examine firm performance following a CEO turnover. Using a sample 
of 173 bank CEO turnovers from 1995 to 2010, I find that the market responds more 
favorably to forced CEO turnover decisions when they are made by a board with more 
independent financial industry experts. I document that following a forced bank CEO 
turnover, improvements in bank performance are positively related to independent 
financial industry expertise on the board, while bank-risk taking is negatively 
correlated with such expertise. This is likely because a properly functioning board is 
particularly important when a forced CEO turnover becomes necessary, and industry-
specific expertise greatly improves boards’ ability to locate a superior successor CEO 
and to monitor and advise new management in such a crisis situation. I do not find 
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The recent policy debate over corporate governance reform has sparked new 
interest in board structure (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010).  When examining 
the impact of board structure on board monitoring and advising, previous studies 
largely focus on board independence (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Denis and Denis, 1995), 
board size (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008), CEO-chairman 
duality (e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2011), 
staggered boards (e.g., Bange and Mazzeo, 2004; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005),  and 
independent directors’ expertise that is not related to the industry in which the firm 
operates  (e.g., Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Güner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008).  
Less attention has been paid to independent industry-specific expertise on boards, 
which arguably combines inside directors’ industry knowledge (e.g., Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Klein, 1998) and independent directors’ vigilance (e.g., Mace, 
1986; Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997).  Industry-
specific expertise may lower directors’ cost to obtain and process information, and 
may therefore reduce information asymmetry and improve board functioning (e.g., 
Kroll, Walters, and Wright, 2008; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010).  In this study I 
investigate this view by examining the correlation between independent financial 
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industry expertise on a bank board and bank performance following a forced CEO 
turnover, relative to voluntary CEO turnovers.   
I focus on the banking industry for three reasons.  First, information asymmetry 
is arguably more of an issue in the banking industry due to the complexity of banks 
and the opacity of bank operations (e.g., Furfine, 2001; Levine, 2004).  Industry-
specific expertise may therefore be particularly important for independent bank 
directors to be able to monitor and advise management.  Some extreme examples of 
the primary occupations of independent bank directors in this study are dentists, 
professional volunteers, dairy farmers, and chiropractors.  It is reasonable to assume 
that without a solid financial industry background, independent bank directors are less 
able to fulfill their fiduciary duties.  Second, financial industry expertise is more 
readily observable than other types of industry expertise.  The definition of a financial 
industry expert in this study follows Güner et al. (2008) and Minton, Taillard, and 
Williamson (2013).  A director is classified as a financial industry expert if the 
director is (was) employed by a financial organization (e.g., venture capital firm; 
consumer lending company; mutual fund; hedge fund) or a banking regulator.1  Last 
but not least, blamed for the recent financial crisis (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Adams, 
                                                 
1 This classification is somewhat different from that used in Güner et al. (2008) and Minton et al. (2013) 
due to the purpose of this study.  In contrast with the previous studies, I do not classify finance-related 
officers at non-financial firms or business professors as financial industry experts because they may not 
necessarily have a strong understanding of bank operations.  Furthermore, the two cited studies do not 
classify directors with work experience with a banking regulator as financial industry experts.  
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2011), governance mechanisms in the banking industry have received growing 
attention since then (e.g., Adams, 2012).  Adams (2011) suggests that “measures of 
governance that have been the focus of recent governance policies are insufficient to 
describe governance failures attributed to financial firms.”  In line with such concerns, 
government regulators and institutional investors are requiring banks to restructure 
their boards with more independent directors that have financial industry expertise.2  
However, our knowledge regarding the impact of independent financial industry 
expertise on the quality of bank board functioning is quite limited.   
Forced CEO turnovers make a unique set to test the quality of board functioning.  
In such crisis situations, the board of directors is not only responsible for replacing the 
poorly performing CEO (Weisbach, 1988), but also responsible for identifying and 
attracting “superior replacement managers” (Denis and Denis, 1995) and providing 
advice and counsel (Mace, 1986; also see Adams et al., 2010).  Given that 
independent directors typically spend only “a limited amount of time with the 
organization” (Judge and Dobbins, 1995) but are likely to “act in crisis situations” 
(Mace, 1986), a properly functioning board may be particularly important when a 
bank needs to oust its incumbent CEO and adjust its strategies (Parrino, 1997).  While 
previous bank CEO turnover studies tend to focus on the probability of forced CEO 
turnover (e.g., Webb, 2008; Palvia, 2011), this study investigates the relation between 
                                                 
2 “Help Wanted: Bank Boards Seeking Competent Directors”, Stephen Gandel, TIME, May 20, 2009. 
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bank performance following a forced CEO turnover and board structure with a focus 
on independent directors’ industry-specific expertise.  With such expertise, 
independent directors may be better able to filter out exogenous performance shocks 
when assessing the true quality of candidate CEOs (e.g., Jenter and Kanaan, 2010), 
and to advise and monitor the successor CEO.  If this were the case, independent 
financial industry expertise should positively affect board functioning and, ultimately, 
bank performance following a forced CEO turnover.  In this study, I examine post-
turnover bank performance to assess the quality of board functioning. 
I investigate the relationship between independent financial industry expertise 
and the functioning of a bank board with a sample of 173 bank CEO turnovers, 
including 70 forced turnovers and 103 voluntary turnovers.  I find a higher rate of 
forced bank CEO turnovers during periods of financial turmoil, consistent with Jenter 
and Kanaan (2010).  In an event study examining cumulative abnormal stock returns 
(CARs) around the announcements of a bank CEO turnover, I find that the market 
response to forced CEO turnovers is significantly positive while such response to 
voluntary CEO turnovers is statistically and economically insignificant.  I further find 
that the positive market response is driven by forced turnover decisions made by a 
bank board with more independent financial industry experts.  The evidence indicates 
that the market recognizes the significant role of financial industry experts in a CEO 
firing decision and believes that they are likely to help improve the status quo.   
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In an examination of post-turnover bank performance, I find that forced CEO 
turnover and outsider succession significantly improve bank performance.  After 
controlling for the interactive effects between forced CEO turnover and board 
structure, forced CEO turnover does not improve post-turnover bank performance 
anymore.  The improvements in bank performance following a forced CEO turnover 
are driven by banks with more independent financial industry experts on their boards.  
In contrast, board independence does not benefit forced CEO turnovers in terms of ex-
post performance.  Consistent with Minton et al. (2013), independent financial 
industry experts tend to encourage risk-taking following a CEO turnover, but they are 
negatively correlated with risk-taking at banks with a forced CEO turnover.  This is 
likely because in the crisis situation where the performance has been poor and the 
bank needs to replace its CEO, it is more important for the bank to decrease risk-
taking and restore its stability.  Independent directors with financial industry expertise 
may be better able to monitor and advise the successor CEO in such efforts.  The 
evidence suggests that independent financial industry expertise improves the 
functioning of a bank board in the period following a forced CEO turnover.   
These findings are robust when grey directors are included, suggesting that “grey” 
financial industry experts may also contribute to proper board functioning in crisis 
situations.  These findings are also robust to the use of annual accounting data and to 
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alternative measures of risk-taking.  Moreover, the improvements in ex-post 
performance are not driven by mean reversion.  
These findings add to the growing literature suggesting the importance of 
directors’ industry-specific expertise on board functioning.  The new evidence of a 
positive correlation between independent financial industry expertise and bank 
performance following a forced turnover provides empirical support to the recent 
studies that emphasize independent directors’ industry-specific expertise (e.g., Fields, 
Fraser, and Subrahmanyam, 2012; Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2012; Wang, Xie, 
and Zhu, 2013).  This study also adds to the literature on the relationship between 
forced CEO turnover and ex-post firm performance.  The evidence suggests that 
forced CEO turnovers do not necessarily improve firm performance.  The 
improvements in firm performance following a forced CEO turnover are to an extent 
driven by independent directors’ expertise in the industry in which the firm operates.  
This may explain the documented insignificant relationship between forced CEO 
turnover and ex-post performance at community banks (Schaeck, Cihak, Maechler, 
and Stolz, 2012).   Finally, this study has implications for banking policies and 
regulations that emphasize independent directors’ financial industry background. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, I discuss 
related literature and provide some background information on regulatory 
requirements on bank board structure.  In Chapter 3, I describe the data.  Chapters 4, 5, 
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and 6 are dedicated to reporting the empirical results.  I present robustness tests in 





Related literature and background information 
 
2.1.  Directors’ expertise 
 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) examine stock market reaction to the 
announcement of the appointment of an independent director.  They find that a 
director’s occupation does not impact abnormal stock returns around announcements.  
They argue that independent directors are equally valuable, independent of their 
occupation.  The evidence in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) is supportive of this 
argument.   
Recent studies suggest that independent directors with expertise in the industry 
in which the firm operates is important for internal control mechanisms.  Eng and 
Mak (2003) argue that such expertise on a board and corporate disclosure are 
substitutes, suggesting the important role of independent expertise in corporate 
control.  Gul and Leung (2004) find consistent evidence.  They also find that 
CEO/chairman duality limits corporate disclosure and independent industry-specific 
expertise on a board weakens such negative association.  A more recent study by 
Wang et al. (2012) finds that independent industry-specific expertise on an audit 
committee lowers the likelihood of earnings management and financial fraud.  
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Besides, such expertise on a compensation committee reduces excess CEO 
compensation but increases the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor performance.  
Previous studies have also shown that independent directors’ industry-specific 
expertise is important to firm performance, strategies, and value.  Kor and Misangyi 
(2008) argue that independent industry-specific expertise can, to some extent, offset 
the lack of industry experience by top management.  In line with this view, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) find better performance at US firms with founding-family 
ownership. This is likely because, as suggested in Anderson and Reeb (2004), 
families may place independent directors with industry-specific expertise on the board 
for performance related reasons.  This indicates that founding families recognize the 
value of independent industry-specific expertise on a board.  Moreover, Dass, Kini, 
Nanda, and Onal (2011) find that outside directors’ industry-specific expertise is 
negatively correlated with cash-conversion cycle, inventory, and accounts receivable 
while positively correlated with accounts payable.  They also find that such expertise 
contributes to better investment strategies.  They argue that with a better 
understanding of industry “conditions and trends”, outside directors with industry-
specific expertise can better help firms shape policies and strategies.  Consistent with 
these findings, Fields et al. (2012) document that independent industry-specific 
expertise on a board not only helps firms lower the cost of debt, but also helps firms 
obtain better credit terms.  Using a sample of industrial firms in the S&P 1500 indexes, 
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Faleye et al. (2012) find that such expertise significantly increases firm value.  This is 
likely because independent industry-specific expertise contributes to firm innovation 
and corporate control (e.g., CEO turnover decisions and CEO compensation). 
However, Minton et al. (2013) find different results.  Their evidence from the 
banking industry shows that independent financial industry expertise on a bank board 
is positively correlated with poor stock performance and risk-taking during the recent 
financial crisis, and the correlation is stronger among large commercial banks.  They 
suggest that it is because financial industry experts may encourage bank management 
to exploit the “too big to fail” effect.  Their findings might have captured the fact that 
in general financial industry experts encourage risk-taking, and when a major 
financial crisis strikes, such strategy would lead to greater losses.  In contrast, this 
study examine the impact of independent financial industry expertise on a bank 
performance following a forced CEO turnover, where financial industry expertise 
may be particularly important in successor CEO selecting, strategy reshaping, and 
management monitoring. 
 
2.2.   Determinants of post-turnover performance 
 
The turnover literature suggests that, in general, forced CEO turnover leads to 
improved ex-post performance because of improved management (e.g., Denis and 
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Denis, 1995; Weisbach, 1988; Fredrickson et al., 1988).  Huson et al. (2004) 
specifically point out that the magnitude of improvement in performance is positively 
correlated with board independence.  However, a recent study by Schaeck et al. (2011) 
does not find improved bank performance following the forced turnover of a 
community bank CEO.  Successor origin also impacts post-turnover performance.  
For instance, Khurana and Nohria (2000) find that following a forced CEO turnover, 
an insider succession leads to statistically and economically insignificant performance 
changes while an outsider succession leads to better performance.  In line with this 
notion, Adams and Mansi (2009) find evidence that successor origin is correlated with 
the change in firm value.  Huson et al. (2004) document a positive correlation 
between outsider succession and expected change in subsequent performance.  As a 
result, Borokhovich et al. (1996) find that abnormal stock returns around forced CEO 
turnover announcements are significantly positive for outsider successions but 
significantly negative for insider successions.   
Post-turnover performance may be related to board size.  Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) argue that board size is negatively related to firm performance.  This 
is likely because of inefficiency and the free-rider problem associated with large 
boards (e.g., Jensen, 1993).  However, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) suggest that 
very small and very large boards can both be optimal, depending on firm complexity.  
In line with this argument, Adams and Mehran (2008) find that Tobin’s Q is 
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increasing in bank board size, given that banks are comparatively large and complex.  
Moreover, Pathan (2009) argues that small boards and more powerful boards tend to 
restrain bank risk-taking. 
A staggered board deters takeover and thus hinders market discipline (e.g., 
Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002), resulting in less managerial effort.  
Consistent with this, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find lower Tobin’s Q at firms with a 
staggered board.  Faleye (2007) further suggests that a staggered board decreases the 
probability of forced CEO turnover at underperforming firms.  Mahoney and 
Mahoney (1993) and Faleye (2007) both find a negative market reaction to the 
announcement of the adoption of a classified board.  Therefore, a staggered board 
may be negatively associated with post-turnover improvements in firm performance. 
An independent board is believed to be associated with better governance quality.  
Beasley (1996) suggests that firms committing financial statement fraud tend to have 
a significantly lower percentage of independent directors.  Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker (1999) find that firms with a weak board are more likely to overcompensate 
their CEOs.  Although in general board independence does not significantly impact 
long term firm performance (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Klein, 1998; Bhagat 
and Black, 2002), it is positively correlated with firm performance following a CEO 
turnover (e.g., Huson et al., 2004). 
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According to Yermack (2004), with all incentives accounted for, a $1,000 
increase in firm value increases the wealth of a Fortune 500 firm director by 11 cents.  
A one standard deviation change in firm performance implies a change of about 
$285,000 in the director’s wealth.  Thus a well-motivated independent director has a 
good reason to monitor management.  In line with this reasoning, studies have shown 
that the percentage of equity-based compensation and ownership by independent 
directors are positively correlated with a higher probability of forced CEO turnover at 
underperforming firms (e.g., Perry, 1999; Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988).  
However, a higher percentage of equity-based compensation as well as a greater 
ownership by independent bank directors may encourage excessive risk-taking, 
maximizing the value of under-priced deposit insurance.  The impact of these 
incentives on bank performance following a forced CEO turnover is not clear.    
Woidtke (2002) argues that institutional investors are likely to monitor 
management, although the value effect of institutional monitoring depends on the 
objectives of the institutions.  Therefore, institutional ownership may be positively 





2.3.  Regulatory requirements on bank board structure 
 
Recent efforts by government regulators to increase bank board independence 
can be traced back to the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act of 1991 (FDICIA).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) also emphasizes 
board independence but it applies only to public financial institutions.  The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued the “Pocket Guide for Directors” (the 
guide) to non-public banks following the passage of SOX.  The guide, which 
emphasizes “the need for a strong and independent board of directors”, encourages 
practices quite similar to, or even identical to those in SOX.  The Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 3 , and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) also issued similar guidance to non-public banks 
which they supervised.  Banks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ are 
required by the exchanges to have a board that is comprised of a majority of 
independent directors.   
At the same time, the definition of “independence” has become stricter in the last 
decade.  The Amendments to the Housing Act on July 30, 2008 specifies that “an 
individual is not eligible to be an independent bank director if the individual serves as 
                                                 
3 On July 21, 2011, the OTS became part of the OCC. 
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an officer, employee, or director of any member of the bank, or of any recipient of 
loans from the bank”.  The three stock exchanges also adopted stricter definition of 
“independent director” since 2002. 
Previously, regulations largely focused on board independence.  Although FDIC 
implemented new requirements on independent directors’ financial industry expertise 
following the banking crisis in the 1990s, they are applied only to bank audit 
committees.  Until recently, little attention was paid to the occupational background 
of independent directors at banks.  Following the recent crisis, government regulators 
and institutional investors are requiring banks to restructure their boards with more 






Data and summary statistics 
 
3.1.  Bank CEO turnovers 
 
In this study, I explore the relation between independent financial industry 
expertise and post-turnover bank performance using a sample of CEO turnovers at US 
banks in the 1995-2010 period.4  To identify changes in CEO position, I start with all 
firms in Standard & Poor’s Execucomp database with an SIC code between 6000 and 
6300 from January 1st, 1995 to December 31st, 2010.  Of these 295 firms, I exclude 
non-lending firms with SIC codes 6172 (Finance Lessors), 6099 (Functions Rel to 
Dep Bkg, Nec), 6282 (Investment Advice), 6163 (Loan Brokers), 6200 (Security & 
Commodity Brokers), and 6211 (Security Brokers & Dealers).  I also exclude the 
three federal credit agencies (Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and Sallie Mae) because they 
are different from other financial institutions due to their unique role as quasi-
government entities.5  I manually check the remaining firms and exclude those firms 
(e.g., American Express, Mellon Financial Corp, State Street Corporation, Finova 
                                                 
4 I start with the year 1995 because board information prior to 1994 is not available in the Edgar filing 
database. 
5For example, Sallie Mae functioned as a government-sponsored enterprise until its privatization 
process was finished in 2004 and even after that point it was still widely regarded as quasi-government 
backed.  However, the main results do not change after I include the 10 CEO turnovers at these three 
institutions during the sample period. 
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Group, and Financial Federal Corporation) whose primary service is not making loans 
(e.g., wire transferring and investment advice).  This yields a final raw sample of 202 
firms, including 150 commercial banks and bank-holding companies, one finance 
services company, five mortgage bankers, 33 federal-chartered savings institutions 
and 13 non-federal-chartered savings institutions.  Following Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011), I define the lending firms from this sample as banks.  With a mean age of 23 
years (median age of 24 years), this final raw sample is potentially biased towards 
large banks because Execucomp tends to cover larger firms.  The silver lining from 
this potential bias is that those banks represent the bulk of the market value of all 
banks in the US and their turnover decisions and performance have a significant 
impact on the industry and its “aggregate wealth” (Huson et al., 2004). 
After I identify CEO changes at the 202 sample banks through the Execucomp 
database, I search for sample banks’ announcements and related news on their top 
management changes through LexisNexis and Factiva.  For the purpose of this study, 
I exclude CEO turnovers that are directly related to M&A activities.  I also exclude 
turnovers of interim/acting CEOs that serve less than one year.  This selection process 
yields 173 bank CEO turnovers at 112 unique banks.6  Together with the information 
                                                 
6 The sample size is small compared with cross-industry studies.  However, sample size tends to be 
limited in studies on bank CEO turnovers (see, e.g., Hubbard and Palia, 1995, 61 CEO turnovers; 
Webb, 2008, 36 CEO turnovers; Palvia, 2011, 169 CEO turnovers).  Of the 112 unique banks during 
the 1995-2010 period, one bank (0.89%) has five CEO turnovers, three banks (2.68%) have four CEO 
turnovers, five banks (4.46%) have three CEO turnovers, 38 banks (33.93%) have two CEO turnovers, 
and 65 banks (58.04%) have one CEO turnover. 
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provided by Execucomp, I am able to obtain turnover announcement date and 
effective date, CEO age and tenure at turnover for these turnovers.  For the entire 
CEO turnover sample, as shown in panel A of Table 1, the total assets of a median 
(mean) bank is 12,380.50 (77,235.37) million (all tables are included in Appendix A).  
The median (mean) outgoing bank CEO is 62 (61.34) years old and has served as a 
CEO for 9 (10.43) years.   
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.2.  Bank board structure 
 
Information on board structure in the turnover year is obtained from the bank’s 
proxy statement (Form 14A) immediately before the turnover announcement through 
SEC’s Edgar filing database.  Board information for 13 turnovers is set to missing 
either because the proxy statements are not found in the Edgar database (e.g., Hanmi 
Financial Corp, 1999), or because the proxy statements do not provide enough 
information (e.g., the primary occupation of the directors is not reported by Bancwest 
Corp in 2004).  Following the literature (e.g., Huson et al., 2004), I classify a director 
as an insider if the director is, or was employed by the bank, its subsidiary, or an 
affiliated organization.  Other directors are classified as outside directors.  I examine 
each outside director’s detailed information reported in the proxy statement and 
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classify an outside director as “grey” if the director (1) is employed by one of the 
following firms: consulting/advisory firm, investment bank, law firm, insurance 
company; or (2) has significant business relationship with the bank; or (3) is related to 
an officer of the bank (e.g., Huson et al., 2001).  Other outside directors are classified 
as independent directors.  As reported in panel A of Table 1, a median bank board has 
13 directors, of which 67.93% (78.86%) are independent (outside) directors.7  These 
percentages are similar to those reported in Adams and Mehran (2003) and Booth, 
Cornett, and Tehranian (2002).  In this study, board independence is defined as the 
ratio between the number of independent directors and board size.  The alternative 
definition of board independence (the ratio between the number of outside directors 
and board size) is employed in the robustness tests.  Furthermore, for a median bank, 
the average tenure of independent (outside) directors is 10.13 (10.18) years.   
As previously mentioned, a director is classified as a financial industry expert if 
the director is, or was employed by a financial institution (e.g., venture capital firm; 
consumer lending company; mutual fund; hedge fund) or a banking regulator (e.g., 
the FRB; the FDIC; the OCC).  I find that other director occupations include, but are 
not limited to, attorneys, dentists, realtors, professional volunteer, professors, 
surgeons, farmers, dairy farmers, chiropractors, judges, and executive officers of 
industrial firms.  While the percentage of independent directors is high, the median 
                                                 




percentage of independent (outside) financial industry experts (the number of 
independent (outside) financial industry experts on a board/board size) is only 10.82% 
(12.50%).  The correlation coefficient between the percentages of independent 
(outside) directors and independent (outside) financial industry experts is 0.2295 with 
a p-value of 0.0064 (0.1219 with a p-value of 0.1512). 
CEO/chairman duality is found in the proxy statement immediately before a 
turnover announcement.  Of the 173 outgoing CEOs in the entire turnover sample, 
116 (67.05%) are also board chairmen. 
 
3.3.  Director compensation and ownership structure 
 
Director compensation information in the turnover year is obtained either from 
the Execucomp database or from bank filings.  I calculate the percentage of director 
equity-based compensation (EBC) using the year-end stock price in the prior year for 
stock grants and I use the modified Black-Scholes option valuation model for option 
grants (e.g., Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002).  As reported in panel A of Table 1, 
the median EBC is 48.69%.   
When calculating institutional ownership, I exclude ownership by institutions 
affiliated with the bank, such as a subsidiary bank or employee stock ownership plan 
trust, because these institutions are not likely to monitor bank management (e.g., 
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Adams and Mehran, 2003).  The median ownership by CEO and his or her immediate 
family, independent (outside) directors as a group, and institutional investors are 
0.72%, 1.11% (1.37%) , 5.06%, respectively.   
 
3.4.  Forced and voluntary CEO turnovers 
 
Following the turnover literature (e.g., Huson et al., 2001), I classify a turnover 
as forced if: (1) the announcement mentions strategy or opinion differences between 
the CEO and the board; or (2) related news uses words such as “ousted, fired, or 
forced out”; or (3) the CEO is under the age of 60 and he (or she) is leaving for 
reasons other than death, health issues, or reposition; or (4) the retiring CEO is under 
the age of 60 and does not announce his (or her) intention to retire at least 6 months 
prior to the effective turnover date.  All other turnovers are classified as voluntary.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequency of bank CEO turnovers over the 1995-2010 
period.  Of all the 173 bank CEO turnovers identified in this study, 70 are classified as 
forced turnovers and 103 are classified as voluntary turnovers.  The average annual 
turnover rate (the ratio between the annual number of turnovers and the annual 
number of banks) is 7.37%, similar to that reported in Hubbard and Palia (1995) (6%, 
a sample of 116 banks) over the three years before the introduction of interstate bank 
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regulation.8  The average annual forced turnover rate (40.46%) is higher than that 
reported in Taylor (2010) (21.3%, financial firms, 1970-2007) and that reported in 
Huson et al. (2004) (16%, firms across industries, 1971-1994).  It is because the 
sample period in this study covers two financial crises (the 1998 LTCM/Asian 
financial crisis and the recent 2007-2009 crisis) and one recession (2000-2002), 9 in 
which the frequency of forced CEO turnover spiked.  This is consistent with Jenter 
and Kanaan (2010) where they find that CEOs are more likely to be fired during 
periods of industry turmoil. 
 
3.5.  Insider and outsider successions 
 
A succession is labeled an insider succession if the successor holds, or held a 
position in the bank, its subsidiaries or affiliates for more than a year (e.g., Huson et 
al., 2001).  All other successions are labeled an outsider succession.10  Out of the 173 
successions, 37 are classified as outsider successions and 136 are classified as insider 
successions.  Panel B of Table 1 reports that 32.86% (13.59%) of the outgoing CEOs 
are replaced by an outside successor following a forced (voluntary) turnover, lower 
                                                 
8 Hubbard and Palia (1995) find a cumulative turnover rate of 18.1% in the three years before interstate 
banking legislation. I divide this percentage by three to find the approximate annual turnover rate. 
9 CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Index dropped 37.55% during 2000-2002.  
10 I do not differentiate between outside successors from other banks and those from other industries 
(see Parrino, 1997). Of the 34 outside successors, only three come immediately from another industry. 
However, they all have a banking background. 
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(higher) than the 49.6% (9.9%) reported in Parrino (1997) (a sample of firms across 
industries over 1970-1989).  This indicates that outsider succession is more likely 






Market reaction to bank CEO turnover announcements 
 
There have been many empirical studies examining the impact of CEO turnover 
announcement on stock price.  In general, these studies find an insignificant reaction 
across their overall samples but significantly positive market reaction for forced 
turnovers (e.g., Furtado and Karan,1990; Khanna and Poulsen, 1995; Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999).    In this section, I examine the impact of turnover type and board 
structure on stock price around bank CEO turnover announcements, using a sample of 
173 bank CEO turnovers as described in the prior section.11  If the market recognizes 
the value of independent financial industry expertise in improving board functioning, 
there should be a positive correlation between independent financial industry 
expertise and abnormal stock returns around CEO turnover announcement. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of an event study centered on the turnover 
announcement day (day 0). 12   Following the literature (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; 
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Masulis et al., 2007), I report cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) for various windows including [0], [-1, 0], [0, +1], [-1, +1] and [-2, 
+2].  The reported CARs are returns adjusted by a four factor model that includes the 
                                                 
11 I do not test the difference between insider succession and outsider succession because many banks, 
especially those that oust their CEOs, have not selected a successor at the time of announcement, which 
significantly reduces the sample size. 
12 If a CEO turnover is announced on a non-trading day, the next trading day is regarded as day 0. 
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market risk premium (the spread between CRSP value-weighted market return and 
risk-free rate), SMB (the return spread between portfolios of small and big 
capitalization stocks), HML (the return spread between portfolios of high and low 
book-to-market stocks), and a momentum factor.13   The market model parameters are 
estimated with daily returns over the 150-trading-day period 30 days before a turnover 
announcement (e.g., Ellis, 2010).  To be included in this event study, a bank’s stock 
must trade around the announcement day and over the parameter estimation period.  I 
report the results for the remaining 155 CEO turnover announcements in panel A of 
Table 2.   
[Insert Table 2] 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that, for the overall turnover sample, the average 
market reaction (both mean and median) is significant and positive over five event 
windows.  Market reaction to forced turnovers is statistically (at least at the 1% level) 
and economically (with a mean of 4.10% and a median of 2.15% on the 
announcement day) significant over all event windows.  In contrast, CARs for 
voluntary turnovers are statistically and economically insignificant.  The spreads 
between market reactions (mean and median) to forced turnovers and voluntary 
turnovers is statistically (both at the 1% level) and economically (4.46 % and 2.46% 
on the announcement day, respectively) significant over all event windows.  These 
                                                 
13 When using raw stock returns instead of CARs over the five event windows, I find similar results. 
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results are consistent with the findings in the previous CEO turnover literature.  To 
explore the impact of board structure on CARs, I divide the turnover sample into high 
and low groups based on independent financial industry expertise and board 
independence, respectively.  The results reported in panel B of Table 2 show that the 
high independent financial industry expertise group receives more favorable market 
reaction than the low independent financial industry expertise group.  The spread 
between the two groups (mean and median) are statistically (both at the 1% level on 
the announcement day) and economically significant (2.90% and 1.42% on the 
announcement day, respectively) over all but one of the event windows.  In contrast, 
the high board independence group tends to receive more favorable market reaction 
than the low board independence group, but the spread is only significant over [-1, 0] 
and [-1, +1] windows for median comparison.  These preliminary results suggest that 
the market recognizes the value of both independent financial industry experts and 
independent directors in CEO turnover decisions. 
To systematically examine the impacts of turnover type and board structure on 
CARs around CEO turnover announcements, I estimate OLS model (1).  Pairwise 
correlations between independent variables are reported in Table 3 and regression 
results for model (1) are reported in Table 4.. 






																	 % 	                                                               (1)                             
where CARs are abnormal stock returns around bank CEO turnover announcements.  
Forced is a forced turnover indicator that is equal to 1 if a turnover is classified as 
forced and 0 otherwise.  Board Size is the number of directors on a bank board.  
Staggered Board is an indicator that is equal to 1 if a board are classified and 0 
otherwise.  IDTenure is the average tenure of independent directors.  EBC is the ratio 
between independent directors’ equity-based compensation and total compensation.  
IDOwnership, IOwnership, and CEOOwnership are the percentages of shares 
outstanding owned by independent directors as a group, institutional investors, and 
outgoing CEO and his (or her) immediate family, respectively.  CEOTenure is the 
tenure of an outgoing CEO.  Duality is an indicator that is equal to 1 if there is CEO-
chairman duality and 0 otherwise.  %ID is the percentage of independent directors on 
a bank board, while %IFIE is the percentage of independent financial industry experts 
on a bank board.  Size is the natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets.  To test whether 
board independence and independent financial industry expertise are particularly 
important for the decisions of a forced CEO turnover, I include two interaction terms 
(ITS): one is between the forced turnover indicator and board independence (% 
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ID*Forced), the other is between the forced turnover indicator and the percentage of 
independent financial industry experts on a board (% IFIE*Forced).  Because 47 
(41.96%) of the 112 unique banks in the sample have at least two CEO turnovers over 
the sample period, I cluster the standard errors by bank.  
[Insert Table 4] 
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that without controlling for the interactive 
effects between board structure and the forced turnover indicator, CARs for forced 
turnovers are significantly higher (at the 5% level over [0], [-0, +1], and [-1,+1]) than 
those for voluntary turnovers.  In contrast with previous studies, board independence 
(%ID) is not correlated with market reaction.  The percentage of independent 
financial industry experts (%IFIE) is positively correlated with CARs over all event 
windows, significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level in three (one, one) estimates. A one 
standard error increase in %IFIE is associated with a 15.29% increase in CARs on the 
announcement day.  The results suggest that the market recognizes the value of 
independent financial industry expertise for bank CEO turnovers in general.  
Furthermore, board size, independent directors’ equity-based compensation, and bank 
size tend to be positively correlated with CARs while CEO ownership and CEO-




When the two interaction terms are included in the regressions, the coefficients 
on the forced turnover indicator and %IFIE both become insignificant in all estimates.  
However, the coefficient on the interaction term %IFIE*Forced is significant at the   
1% (5%, 10%) level in two (one, one) estimates.  A one standard error increase 
in %IFIE is associated with a 25.30% (34.18%) increase in CARS on the 
announcement day ([-1,+1] window).  The F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on %IFIE and %IFIE*Forced are jointly zero in four estimates.  In 
contrast, the other interaction term, % ID*Forced, is not correlated with CARs in any 
estimate.  F-test (unreported) is not able to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on %ID and %ID*Forced are joint zero.  The evidence indicates that 
forced CEO turnovers tend to receive positive market reaction and it is driven by 
turnover decisions made by a board with more independent financial industry experts.  
One explanation is that these experts are better able to filter out exogenous negative 
performance shocks from CEO quality and are therefore less likely to scapegoat.  
Another explanation is that they may be better able to locate a superior successor, 
leading to truly improved management.  It is also possible that the market believes 
that following a forced turnover, these experts are better able to advise the new 
management during the crisis period.  Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to 






Performance changes around bank CEO turnovers 
 
The CEO turnover literature has shown that turnover type (forced vs. voluntary) 
and successor origin (outsider vs. insider) impact post-turnover performance at 
industrial firms (e.g., Denis and Denis, 1995; Parrino, 1997; Huson et al., 2004).  
However, this may not hold for banks due to the unique nature of their business and 
the heavy regulations they face, along with their different governance mechanisms 
(e.g., Brickley and James, 1987; Adams and Mehran, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2003; 
Becher, Campbell, and Frye, 2005).  Direct evidence from the banking industry is 
limited to date.  Therefore in this section I examine bank performance around CEO 
turnovers within the framework of this study.  Because bank regulators use return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) to measure bank profitability (e.g., Gilbert 
and Wheelock, 2007), and the previous studies suggest that CEO turnovers will 
impact firms’ ROA, abnormal stock performance, and risk-taking (e.g., Huson et al., 
2001; Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg, 2003; Adams and Mansi, 2009;), I employ 
six measures of performance: unadjusted and industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) 




Specifically, I examine bank performance over the 15-quarter period centered on 
the turnover announcement quarter.14  I do not choose a period of three years (e.g., 
Huson et al., 2004) because 60 (34.68%) successor CEOs in the sample survive less 
than three calendar years.  In contrast, only 28 (16.18%) successor CEOs survive less 
than seven quarters.  Arguably, a period of seven fiscal quarters is long enough to test 
the impact of bank CEO turnover on subsequent bank performance.  Besides, 
according to Huson et al. (2001), “quarterly data … would provide a more precise 
measure of the information available to internal monitors when the succession is 
announced”.  As a matter of fact, only 9 out of 70 forced turnover decisions (12.86%) 
are made in the last month of a fiscal year.  It should be noted that quarterly data are 
unaudited.  However, quarterly data (e.g., call report) are also used by banking 
regulators to perform off-site examination of banks (e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1998; 
Hirtle and Lopez, 1999), suggesting their inherent value.  Examinations by bank 
regulators also add credibility to quarterly data.  Moreover, quarterly data may be 
seasonal and changes over the seven-quarter pre- and post-turnover periods may 
partially capture this seasonality.  I utilize industry-adjusted data in the empirical tests 
to alleviate this issue. 
                                                 
14 Unlike forced CEO turnovers, the announcement quarter of a voluntary CEO turnover may be 
different from the effective turnover quarter. To capture the performance change only attributable to a 
successor CEO, I omit the quarter(s) between the turnover announcement quarter and effective 
turnover quarter.  
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To obtain a clean sample, I extensively check bank announcements and news 
reports and exclude banks that announce M&A activity in the seven-quarter period 
either before (four turnovers) or following (17 turnovers) a CEO turnover.  I also 
exclude observations where the successor CEO survives less than seven quarters (28 
turnovers, eight of these are due to bankruptcy).  This selection process results in a 
sample of 124 bank CEO turnovers, including 46 forced turnovers (15 of these CEOs 
are succeeded by an outsider) and 78 voluntary turnovers (12 of these CEOs are 
succeeded by an outsider).  Quarterly data on bank total assets, shareholder’s equity, 
net income, and tier 1 risk-adjusted capital assets ratio from 1993 to 2012 are 
manually collected from Form 10-Q and Form 10-K.  Stock price information is 
obtained through the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
 
5.1.  Changes in return on assets around CEO turnovers 
 
In this section, I compare the changes in return on assets (ROA = net income/the 
book value of total assets, see, e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Adams and Mehran, 
2008) across turnover types and successor origins in the seven-fiscal-quarter pre- and 
post-turnover periods.   
[Insert Figs. 1 and 2] 
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Figs. 1 and 2 (all figures are included in Appendix B) plot sample banks’ median 
industry-adjusted ROA over the 15-quarter period centered on the turnover 
announcement quarter (Q0).15  Industry median ROA is calculated from a pool of 
banks covered by COMPUSTAT from 1993 to 2012.  The upper graph in Fig. 1 
compares forced turnovers with voluntary turnovers.  Banks constantly experiencing 
worse performance tend to fire their CEOs and their performance improves thereafter.  
The lower graph in Fig. 1 compares outsider successions with insider successions.  It 
shows that banks experiencing a significant decrease in performance tend to select an 
outside successor and their performance improves afterward.  Voluntary or insider 
succession does not display a similar pattern.  The upper graph in Fig. 2 suggests that 
among banks that fire their CEOs, those experiencing a more significant decrease in 
performance tend to choose a successor from the outside talent pool, and their 
performance improves.  The lower graph in Fig. 2 indicates that within the voluntary 
turnover group, banks experiencing worse and more volatile performance tend to 
select an outside successor.  
[Insert Table 5] 
In Table 5, I report mean changes in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA in 
the pre-turnover (Quarter -1 minus Quarter -7) and post-turnover (Quarter 7 minus 
Quarter 1) periods.16  Panel A indicates that banks experiencing worse performance 
                                                 
15 I find similar patterns in unadjusted ROA. 
16 Median tests show similar results. 
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(column 1 minus column 2) tend to oust their CEOs, leading to a more significant 
improvement (0.46%, significant at the 1% level).  Panel A of Table 5 also indicates 
outside successors tend to outperform inside successors in the post-turnover period, 
significant at the 10% level (column 3 minus column 4).  Panel B of Table 5 shows 
that among banks with a forced CEO turnover, those that have a worse pre-turnover 
performance tend to select an outsider successor and their improvements in 
performance are more significant in the post-turnover period (column 5 minus column 
7).  Following a voluntary CEO turnover, insider succession leads to a significant 
decrease in performance (at the 5% level, column 6).  Furthermore, outsider 
succession significantly improves performance only when following a forced turnover 
(columns 7 and 8).   
 
5.2.  Changes in return on equity around CEO turnovers 
 
I find similar results with the changes in return on equity (ROE = net income/the 
book value of equity, see, e.g., Billett and Xue, 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009) over the 
15-quarter period around CEO turnovers.  The trends in sample banks’ median 
industry-adjusted ROE in Figs. 3 and 4 are consistent with those shown in Figs. 1 and 
2, respectively.17  
                                                 
17 I find similar patterns in unadjusted ROE. 
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[Insert Figs. 3 and 4] 
Mean changes in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROE reported in Table 6 are 
consistent with the results reported in Table 5.  Panel A shows that banks 
experiencing worse performance tend to replace their CEOs, leading to a more 
significant improvement.  In contrast, there is no significant difference between 
insider successions and outsider succession in both pre- and post-turnover periods.  
Panel B shows that outside successors tend to do better following a forced CEO 
turnover (column 5 minus column 7, significant at the 5% level).  Insider successions 
following a voluntary turnover lead to a significant decrease in ROE (column 6, at the 
10% level).  Outsider successions following a voluntary turnover do not improve 
subsequent ROE.  In contrast, outsider successions following a forced turnover can 
better improve ROE (column 7 minus column 8, significant at the 1% level).  I find 
similar results with industry-adjusted ROE.   
[Insert Table 6] 
 
5.3.  Abnormal stock performance around CEO turnovers 
 
In this section I examine banks’ long-run abnormal stock performance around 
CEO turnovers.  Table 7 reports mean abnormal stock returns over the following six 
window periods around the announcement quarter (Q0): [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], [-Q1], 
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[+Q1], [+Q1, +Q4], [+Q1, +Q7].  Stock returns are adjusted by a four factor model 
that includes the market risk premium (the spread between CRSP value-weighted 
market return and risk-free rate), SMB (the return spread between portfolios of small 
and big capitalization stocks), HML (the return spread between portfolios of high and 
low book-to-market stocks), and a momentum factor.  The market model parameters 
are estimated with data over the 24-month period seven quarters before the turnover 
announcement quarter.  
[Insert Table 7] 
Panel A of Table 7 suggests that voluntary successions and insider successions 
lead to negative abnormal stock performance (columns 2 and 3), both significant at 
the 1% level.  Banks showing a sharp decrease in pre-turnover abnormal stock 
performance, especially during the [-Q7, -Q1] and [-Q4, -Q1] windows (both 
significant at the 1% level) tend to choose an outside successor.  Their abnormal stock 
performance improves in the post-turnover period relative to insider successions 
(column 3 minus column 4, significant at the 10% level over the [+Q1] window).  
As shown in panel B of Table 7, insider successions are associated with negative 
abnormal stock performance, either following a forced turnover (column 5) or a 
voluntary turnover (column 6).  Among banks that fire their CEOs, those with a worse 
abnormal stock performance (at the 5% level) in the pre-turnover period tend to select 
an outside successor.  They significantly outperform banks that have chosen an 
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insider successor following a forced turnover (at least at the 10% level, column 5 
minus column 7).  Moreover, outsider successions following a forced turnover 
significantly outperform those following a voluntary turnover over the [+Q1, +Q4] 
and [+Q1, +Q7] windows (column 7 minus column 8). 
 
5.4.  Changes in risk-taking around CEO turnovers 
 
In this section, I examine changes in bank risk-taking in the seven-quarter pre- 
and post-turnover periods.  Following Laeven and Levine (2009) and others, I use the 
z-score to proxy bank risk-taking, which is defined as “the inverse of the probability 
of insolvency”.  A positive (negative) change in z-score implies a decrease (increase) 
in bank risk-taking.  Following the literature, the z-score is calculated as a bank’s 
average return on assets (ROA) plus capital assets ratio (CAR) divided by the 
standard deviation of return on assets ((ROA)) over the seven-quarter period, or 
mathematically, z = (ROA+CAR)/(ROA).   To deal with the skewness in the z-score, 
I use the natural logarithm of the z-score in the empirical tests (Laeven and Levine, 
2009), hereafter referred to as the z-score. 
[Insert Table 8] 
Results reported in panel A of Table 8 suggest that voluntary turnovers and 
insider successions are associated with an increase in the z-score, significant at the 10% 
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level (columns 2 and 3, respectively).  In contrast, forced turnovers or outsider 
successions do not decrease bank risk-taking.  However, there is no significant 
difference in the change in the z-score between forced and voluntary turnovers, or 
between insider and outsider successions.  I find consistent results in panel B of Table 
8.  Only when following a voluntary turnover, insider successions lead to an increased 






Determinants of post-turnover bank performance 
 
Consistent with the previous turnover literature, results in the previous section 
show that turnover type and successor origin do impact post-turnover bank 
performance.  In this section, I systematically examine the factors that drive the 
changes in post-turnover bank performance.  I am particularly interested in the 
relationship between board structure and post-turnover bank performance.  If 
independent bank directors with financial industry expertise are better able to locate a 
superior replacement CEO and to monitor and advise the new management in crisis 
situations, their expertise should contribute to the improvements in performance 
following a forced CEO turnover.  I test this view by running OLS model (2) and 
report the results in Table 9.   Because some banks have multiple CEO turnovers over 




													 % 	                       (2)                             
where PC is performance change over the seven-quarter post-turnover period, 
including changes in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and ROE, abnormal 
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stock performance, and change in the z-score. 18   Out is an outsider succession 
indicator that is equal to 1 if a successor CEO is an outsider and 0 otherwise.  Crisis is 
a financial crisis indicator variable that is equal to 1 for year 1998 (the LTCM crisis) 
and years 2007-2010 (the recent financial crisis).  I control for the percentage change 
in total assets (equity) for ROA (ROE) specifications because the change in ROA 
(ROE) may partially derive from the change in total assets (equity).  Other variables 
are defined as in model (1).  I include outgoing CEOs’ ownership, tenure, and CEO-
chairman duality status in model (2) because the previous turnover literature (e.g., 
Parrino, 1997; Khurana and Nohria, 2000) suggests that the improvements in 
performance following a forced CEO turnover may come from strategic and structural 
changes, which might be more significant if the outgoing CEO is more powerful.19   
[Insert Table 9] 
Results in Table 9 (columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) indicate that without controlling for 
the interactive effects between forced CEO turnover and board structure, forced CEO 
turnover significantly increases unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and ROE (at 
                                                 
18 Because previous studies suggest that a bank’s risk preference may also be related to unobservable 
factors such as business model and competition (e.g., Yeyati and Micco, 2007), I use the change in the 
z-score instead of the level of the z-score to capture the effect of a CEO turnover on bank risk-taking. 
However, I find similar but weaker results when the level of the z-score is employed in unreported tests. 
19 I do not control chairman/CEO duality for successor CEOs because an outgoing CEO will typically 
remain on the board as the chairman for several months (or even several quarters) before the successor 
CEO takes over the chair position.  For instance, AmSouth Bancorporation announced on December 21, 
1995 that current CEO John W. Woods would be succeeded in January 1996 by C. Dowd Ritter, 
president and COO of the bank.  Mr. Woods would continue as the chairman of the board, an additional 
role to be assumed by Mr. Ritter in August 1996.   
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the 1% level) and abnormal stock performance (at the 10% level).  The magnitude is 
economically significant.  On average, forced turnover increases unadjusted and 
industry-adjusted ROA (ROE) by around 0.50% (9.00%) and abnormal stock 
performance by 27.94%.  Outsider succession leads to a 0.15% improvement in ex-
post performance when measured with unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA, 
significant at the 10% level.  These results are consistent with the previous CEO 
turnover literature.  Moreover, the ownership of an outgoing CEO is negatively 
correlated with the improvements in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and ROE 
while is positively correlated with abnormal stock performance.  The change in equity 
is positively related to the improvements in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROE, 
both significant at the 1% level.  During financial crises, it is more difficult for banks 
to improve their performance following a CEO turnover, significant at the 5% level.  
Furthermore, independent directors’ equity-based compensation and outgoing CEOs’ 
ownership are positively correlated with bank risk-taking, significant at the 10% and 5% 
level, respectively (column 11).  Ultimately, neither board independence nor 
independent financial industry expertise is correlated with any measure of the 
improvement in performance.   
When the interaction terms are included in the estimates (columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 
10), the coefficient on the forced CEO turnover indicator becomes insignificant in all 
estimates, suggesting that a forced CEO turnover does not necessarily improve a 
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bank’s performance if there is no independent financial industry experts on the board.  
Outsider successions tend to improve bank performance when measured with 
unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA (both significant at the 10% level.  In addition, 
outgoing CEOs’ ownership is negatively related to the improvements in post-turnover 
bank performance when measured with unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and 
ROE, significant at the 5% level.  However, it is positively correlated with abnormal 
stock performance, significant at the 10% level.   Moreover, the change in equity is 
positively correlated with the improvements in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROE, 
both significant at the 1% level.  It is more difficult to improve ex-post performance 
when a turnover occurs during a crisis years, significant at the 5% level (except for 
the z-score). 
As discussed previously, a properly functioning board can be particularly 
important when a forced CEO turnover becomes necessary.  And with a solid 
financial industry background, independent directors might be better to able to fulfill 
their duties.  The results reported in Table 9 are consistent with this view.  Columns 2, 
4, 6, and 8 show that independent financial industry expertise is significantly 
positively correlated with the improvements in bank performance following a forced 
CEO turnover when measured with unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and ROE 
(at the 5% level).  On average, a one standard error increase in %IFIE is associated 
with a 1.54% (27.69%) increase in unadjusted ROA (ROE), and a 1.49% (26.90%) 
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increase in industry-adjusted ROA (ROE).  This might be because independent 
directors with financial industry expertise are better able to locate a superior 
successors CEO.  They might also be better able to monitor and advise the 
management during the crisis period.  F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on %IFIE and %IFIE*Forced are jointly zero.  In contrast, the interaction 
term, %ID*Forced, is not related to improvements in post-turnover performance.  F-
test (unreported) is not able to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on %ID 
and %ID*Forced are jointly zero.   
Ultimately, when examining bank-risk taking in the post-turnover period 
(column 12), I find that independent financial industry expertise is positively 
(negatively) correlated with risk-taking (the z-score) for the overall turnover sample, 
significant at the 5% level.  This might be because financial industry experts 
encourage risk taking to take advantage of the “too big to fail” effect and the under-
priced deposit insurance.  However, following a forced CEO turnover, independent 
financial industry expertise significantly decreases (increases) risk-taking (the z-
score), significant at the 5% level.  This is likely because under the crisis situation, 
financial industry experts are better able to control CEO risk-taking and maintain the 








7.1.  Alternative definition of “board independence” 
 
Previous turnover studies suggest that grey directors do not impact the 
documented correlation between board structure and post-turnover performance (e.g., 
Huson et al., 2004).  Because factors such as bank lending relationship and M&A 
activity (Adams and Mehran, 2008) result in more grey directors on bank boards (e.g. 
Adams and Mehran, 2003), grey directors may impact the main findings in this study.   
In this section board independence is defined as the ratio between the number of 
outside directors and board size.  I run OLS models (3) and (4) and report the results 
in panels A and B of Table 10, respectively.  ODTenure is the average tenure of 
outside directors.  ODEBC is equity-based compensation of outside directors.  
ODOwnership is the ownership of outside directors as a group.  %OD is the ratio 
between outside directors and board size.  %OFIE is the ratio between outside 
financial industry experts and board size.  Other variables are defined as in models (1) 
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[Insert Table 10] 
I find similar results when grey directors are included.  Panel A of Table 10 
indicates forced turnovers receive significantly positive market reaction over all but 
one of the event windows.  Outside financial industry expertise is positively 
correlated with CARs, significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level in three (one, one) 
estimates.  On average, one standard error increase in the percentage of outside 
financial industry expertise is associated with an at least 16.62% increase in CARs 
over the five event windows for the entire turnover sample.  After I control for the 
interactive effects between board structure and forced CEO turnover, the forced 
turnover indicator becomes insignificant in all estimates, consistent with the results 
reported in Table 4.  Meanwhile, the coefficient on the interaction 
term, %OFIE*Forced is significant in at the 1% (5%, 10%) level in three (one, one) 
estimates.  On average, a one standard error increase in outside financial industry 
expertise increases CARs on the announcement day of a forced CEO turnover by 
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29.41%.  The evidence suggests the markets understand the value of outside financial 
industry expertise in CEO turnover decisions.  Surprisingly, the coefficient on board 
independence (%OD) is negative in eight estimates, significant at least at the 10% 
level. 
Results reported in panel B of Table 10 are consistent with those reported in 
Table 9.  A forced CEO turnover improves ex-post bank performance only if the 
board is supplemented by outside financial industry expertise.  The coefficient 
on %OFIE*Forced is significant at least at the 5% level when measured with 
unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and ROE.  On average, following a forced 
CEO turnover, a one standard error increase in outside financial industry expertise 
increase unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA (ROE) by 0.74% and 0.80% (13.73% 
and 14.80%), respectively.  In contrast, board independence does not have a similar 
impact on bank performance in the post-turnover period.  The evidence suggests that 
in crisis situations, grey directors with financial industry expertise also contribute to 
the proper functioning of a bank board.  However, I find that outside financial 
industry expertise is negatively correlated with improvements in the post-turnover 
period for the overall sample, significant at least at the 10% level in five estimates.  
This is consistent with Minton et al. (2013) where they find that independent financial 
industry expertise is negatively related to stock performance and Tobin’s Q during the 
recent financial crisis.  Finally, outside financial industry expertise encourages bank 
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risk-taking for the entire turnover sample (at the 1% level), but reduces risk-taking 
following a forced CEO turnover (at the 5% level). 
 
7.2.  Annual accounting data 
 
      As mentioned before, the seasonality in quarterly data might lead to biased 
conclusions on the relationship between the improvements following a forced CEO 
turnover and independent financial industry expertise on a bank board.  In this section 
I test whether the previous results are robust when annual accounting data are used.  
The data are manually collected from sample banks 10-K reports.  Industry median 
ROA and ROE are calculated from the banks covered by COMPUSTAT.  
Observations where the successor CEO does not survive until the end of year two 
(with the turnover year being year 0) are excluded.  Banks that announce M&As in 
these two years are also excluded.  I run OLS model (5) with the dependent variables 
being unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and ROE and report the results in 
columns one through eight of Table 11.  Instead of controlling for the two financial 
crises during the sample period, I include year fixed effects.  Standard errors are 
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[Insert Table 11] 
      The results reported in Table 11 suggest that forced CEO turnovers lead to 
improved unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA, significant at the 5% level (columns 
one and three).  When the interaction terms are included in the model, the relationship 
does not hold anymore.  At the same time, the interaction term, %IFIE*Forced is 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the improvement in ROA following a 
forced CEO turnover comes from banks with more independent financial industry 
expertise on their boards (columns two and four).  On average, a one standard error 
increase in %IFIE is associated with an 8.72% (8.71%) increase in unadjusted 
(industry-adjusted) ROA following a forced CEO turnover.  Financial industry 
experts also tend to improve ROE following a forced CEO turnover, marginally 
significant at the 10% level (columns six and eight).  The evidence indicates that 
independent financial industry expertise does improve board functioning when a bank 
is in a crisis situation.  Compared with Table 9, the weaker results in Table 11 may 






7.3.  Alternative measure of risk 
 
In this section, I test whether my results in Table 9 vary when a different 
measure of risk is employed.  Following the literature, I use the annualized volatility 
of stock returns to measure bank risk-taking (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Esty, 
1998).  A larger volatility implies more risk-taking.  The annualized post-turnover 
volatility is calculated from daily stock returns over the seven-quarter period 
following a CEO turnover.  One advantage of the volatility of stock returns (e.g., 
Laeven and Levine, 2009) is that it relies on the market rather than accounting data.  
One disadvantage is that it may be impacted by issues beyond the scope of this study.  
For instance, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) argue that in 2009, bank stocks may be 
influenced by the threat of nationalization.  Since stock returns are sensitive to these 
year-specific issues I control for year fixed effects instead of relying on the financial 
crisis indicator.  I run OLS model (5) with the dependent variable being the change in 
annualized volatility of stock returns, and report the results in columns nine and ten of 
Table 11.  Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
The results show that forced CEO turnover significantly reduces annualized 
stock return volatility, significant at the 5% level (column 9).  Such reduction in risk-
taking is driven by forced turnover decisions made by a board with more independent 
financial industry experts.  As shown in column 10 of Table 11, when the interaction 
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terms are included, forced CEO turnover does not significantly reduce risk-taking.  
The interaction term, %IFIE*Forced is negatively correlated with the change in 
annualized stock return volatility, significant at the 5% level.  Moreover, independent 
financial industry expertise is positively correlated with risk-taking for the entire 
turnover sample, significant at the 10% level.  These results are consistent with the 
results reported in Table 9.   
 
7.4.  Better board functioning or mean reversion? 
 
        One view is that the observed relationship between improvements in bank 
performance following a forced CEO turnover and independent financial industry 
expertise is driven by mean reversion, rather than better board functioning.  If bank 
performance is worse during the pre-forced-turnover period at banks with more 
independent financial industry experts, the observed relationship may capture the 
more significant improvements in the mean-reverting process.  If this were the case, 
the improved bank performance cannot be attributed to better board functioning. 
        Therefore I test whether more independent financial industry experts on a board 
is associated with worse bank performance in the seven-quarter period before a forced 
CEO turnover.  The results (unreported) reject the possibility that improvements in 
bank performance following a forced CEO turnover are due to mean reversion.  I do 
51 
 
not find a significant correlation between independent financial industry expertise and 
pre-turnover bank performance among banks that oust their CEOs, with or without 
controlling for bank risk-taking. 
 
7.5.  Do independent financial industry experts influence other independent 
directors? 
 
        In this section I test whether independent directors without a financial industry 
background will rely on independent financial industry experts for their expertise.  To 
test this possibility, I replace %IFIE with a dummy variable IFIEdummy that is 1 if 
there is at least one independent financial industry expert on a board and 0 otherwise.  
I also replace the interaction term %IFIE*Forced with IFIEdummy*Forced in the 
regressions.  The results (unreported) suggest that the above dummy variable and 
interaction term are not correlated with improvements in bank performance following 
a forced turnover of a bank CEO.  One explanation is that independent directors 
without a financial industry background do not rely on financial industry experts on 
the same board, otherwise they would be sending out signals of incompetence.  






Conclusion and Summary 
 
With a sample of 173 US bank CEO turnovers, I find that relative to voluntary 
turnovers of a bank CEO, forced turnovers are typically preceded by a significant 
decline in bank performance and followed by significant improvements in ex-post 
performance.  However, the impact of forced CEO turnover on ex-post performance is 
dependent on bank board structure.  Market reaction to turnover announcements tends 
to agree with the view that forced turnover decisions made by a board with more 
independent financial industry experts are likely to improve the status quo.   
In line with this market belief, evidence from post-turnover bank performance 
indicates that improvements in performance following a forced turnover of a bank 
CEO are related to independent financial industry experts on a bank board.  The 
empirical results show that the forced turnover indicator is significantly positively 
correlated with improvements in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and ROE as 
well as abnormal stock performance when the interactive effects between independent 
financial industry expertise and forced CEO turnover are not controlled.  Once I 
control for the interactive effects, the forced turnover indicator becomes insignificant 
in all estimates.  Moreover, independent financial industry experts are better able to 
control bank risk-taking and maintain the stability of banks following a forced CEO 
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turnover.  The evidence is consistent with the view that industry-specific expertise 
improves board functioning, which is particularly important during the period 
following a forced CEO turnover.  It is likely because such expertise lowers the cost 
of independent industry experts on a corporate board to obtain and process 
information, and may therefore improve their ability to locate a superior successor 
CEO and to advise and monitor management in a crisis situation.  However, board 
independence does not show a similar impact on either improvements in performance 
or bank risk-taking.  These results are robust when annual accounting data, alternative 
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Statistics are for a sample of 173 turnovers during the 1995-2010 period. Panel A reports summary 
statistics while panel B reports turnover frequency during the 16-year period. A director is 
classified as an insider if the director is, or was employed by the bank, its subsidiary or affiliated 
organization. Other directors are classified as outside directors. An outside director is classified as 
“grey” if the director (1) is employed by one of the following firms: consulting/advisory firm, 
investment bank, law firm, insurance company; or (2) has significant business relationship with 
the bank; or (3) is related to an officer of the bank. Other outside directors are classified as 
independent directors. A director is classified as a financial industry expert if the director is or was 
employed by another financial organization or a banking regulator. A turnover is classified as 
forced if: (1) the turnover announcement mentions different strategy or opinion between the CEO 
and the board; or (2) related news uses words such as “ousted, fired, forced out”; or (3) the CEO is 
under the age of 60 and he (or she) is leaving for reasons other than death, health issues or 
reposition; or (4) the retiring CEO is under the age of 60 and does not announce his (or her) 
intention to retire at least 6 months prior to the effective turnover date. Other turnovers are 
classified as voluntary turnovers. A succession is labeled an insider succession if the successor 
holds, or held position(s) in the bank, its subsidiaries, or affiliates for more than a year. Other 
successions are classified as outsider successions.  Board Size is the number of directors on a bank 
board.  Equity Based Compensation is the percentage of independent directors' equity based 








Variable N Mean Median Std. dev. 25th Percentile 75th Percentile
Total Assets (Million) 173 77,235.37 12,380.50 278,215.00 4,990.21 36,039.09
Outgoing CEO Age 173 61.34 62.00 6.13 58.00 65.00
Outgoing CEO Tenure (Year) 173 10.43 9.00 7.57 4.00 15.00
Board Size 140 13.48 13.00 4.14 11.00 16.00
% Outside Directors 140 78.86 81.25 11.99 72.73 87.50
% Independent Directors 140 67.93 70.00 13.75 56.70 77.78
Outside Director Tenure (Year) 140 10.16 10.18 3.52 7.83 12.22
Independent Director Tenure (Year) 140 10.11 10.13 3.55 7.67 12.09
% Outside Financial Industry Experts 140 15.54 12.50 13.23 6.25 22.22
% Independent Financial Industry Experts 140 13.01 10.82 12.25 4.35 18.75
Equity Based Compensation 140 44.90 48.69 31.78 11.00 69.01
% Ownership by CEO (& Family Members) 140 3.37 0.72 8.96 0.38 1.56
% Ownership by Outside Directors 140 3.88 1.37 6.91 0.38 3.74
% Ownership by Independent Directors 140 3.59 1.11 6.69 0.31 2.99
% Ownership by Institutional Investors 140 7.02 5.06 9.28 0.00 11.55




(1) (2) (2)/(1) (3) (3)/(2) (4) (5) (5)/(2) (6) (6)/(3) (7) (7)/(4)
1995 162 13 8.02% 1 7.69% 12 2 15.38% 0 0.00% 2 16.67%
1996 165 3 1.82% 0 0.00% 3 0 0.00% 0 - 0 0.00%
1997 171 8 4.68% 1 12.50% 7 1 12.50% 1 100.00% 0 0.00%
1998 170 7 4.12% 4 57.14% 3 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
1999 162 6 3.70% 1 16.67% 5 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
2000 160 11 6.88% 4 36.36% 7 2 18.18% 2 50.00% 0 0.00%
2001 154 13 8.44% 6 46.15% 7 5 38.46% 3 50.00% 2 28.57%
2002 151 5 3.31% 1 20.00% 4 0 0.00% 0 - 0 0.00%
2003 153 13 8.50% 5 38.46% 8 3 23.08% 1 20.00% 2 25.00%
2004 151 10 6.62% 5 50.00% 5 4 40.00% 3 60.00% 1 20.00%
2005 141 11 7.80% 3 27.27% 8 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
2006 136 10 7.35% 2 20.00% 8 1 10.00% 0 0.00% 1 12.50%
2007 130 17 13.08% 4 23.53% 13 6 35.29% 2 50.00% 4 30.77%
2008 122 19 15.57% 13 68.42% 6 5 26.32% 5 38.46% 0 0.00%
2009 113 17 15.04% 14 82.35% 3 5 29.41% 5 35.71% 0 0.00%
2010 106 10 9.43% 6 60.00% 4 3 30.00% 1 16.67% 2 -
Year Average 147 10.81 7.37% 4.38 40.46% 6.44 2 21.39% 1.44 32.86% 0.88 13.59%
Firm-Year/Total 2347 173 7.37% 70 40.46% 103 37 21.39% 23 32.86% 14 13.59%















Table 2. CARs around CEO turnover announcements 
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 155 CEO turnover announcements over various event windows including [0], [-1, 0], [0, +1], 
[-1, +1], and [-2, +2]. CARs are stock returns adjusted by a four factor model that includes the market risk premium, SMB (the return spread between portfolios of 
small and big capitalization stocks), HML (the return spread between portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks), and a momentum factor. The market model 
parameters are estimated with data over the 150-trading-day period 30 days before the turnover announcement. To be included in this event study, a bank’s stock 
must trade around announcement day and over the parameter estimation period.  In panel A, the turnover sample is divided into two groups based on the type of 
turnover: forced and voluntary turnovers.  In panel B, the turnover sample is divided into high and low groups based on the level of independent financial industry 
expertise and board independence, respectively.  Brown-Warner t-statistics for means, z-statistics from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for medians, z-statistics from 
generalized sign tests for the percentages of positive CARs, and t-statistics from two-tailed t-tests for the spreads are reported in Italics.   
 
Mean Median % Positive Mean (1) Median (2) % Positive Mean (3) Median % (1) - (3) (2) - (4)
[0] 1.31%*** 0.50%*** 59.35% 4.10%*** 2.15%*** 82.76%***  -0.36%** -0.31% 45.36% 4.46%*** 2.46%***
4.95 2.93 1.21 8.48 4.67 2.71 -2.04 -1.27 -0.83 3.85 6.04
[-1,  0] 2.26%*** 0.28%** 59.35% 6.28%*** 2.06%*** 68.97% -0.14% 0.11% 53.61% 6.42%*** 1.95%***
3.79 2.22 0.89 5.98 3.54 1.08 -0.62 0.54 0.84 2.86 3.91
[0,  +1] 2.22%*** 0.57%*** 60.00% 5.76%*** 3.16%*** 81.03%*** 0.11% -0.25% 47.42% 5.65%*** 3.41%***
5.36 3.57 1.05 7.54 4.59 2.71 1.00 -0.27 -0.21 4.07 5.45
[-1, +1] 2.80%*** 0.48%*** 58.06% 7.02%*** 3.77%*** 75.86%* 0.28%* -0.17% 48.45% 6.74%*** 3.94%***
3.49 3.18 0.56 4.69 4.20 1.35 1.50 -0.12 -0.42 4.26 4.55
[-2, +2] 2.68%*** 1.07%*** 61.94%* 6.15%*** 3.68%*** 75.86%** 0.60%** 0.19% 53.61% 5.55%*** 3.49%***
3.23 3.59 1.69 3.74 3.92 1.90 1.69 0.87 0.84 3.38 3.84
N 155 155 58 58 97 97
Panel A - CARs Around CEO Turnover Announcements by Turnover Type
Spread
Window
All Turnovers Forced Turnovers Voluntary Turnovers
64 
 
Table 2. Cont’d  
 
 
 Window Mean Median % Positive Mean Median % Positive Mean Median
[0] 2.79%*** 1.11%*** 72.73%*** -0.11% -0.31% 50.00% 2.90%*** 1.42%***
7.04 4.10 2.72 -1.02 -0.04 1.21 2.46 3.22
[-1,  0] 4.58%*** 0.58%*** 66.23%** 0.08% 0.11% 56.41% 4.50%** 0.47%***
5.24 3.04 1.77 0.16 0.33 0.22 1.99 2.15
[0,  +1] 3.76%*** 1.22%*** 66.23%*** 0.81% 0.22% 57.69% 2.95%** 1.00%**
6.96 3.64 2.25 1.00 1.44 0.02 2.07 2.06
[-1, +1] 4.72%*** 1.23%*** 63.64% 1.09%* 0.16% 56.41% 3.63%** 1.07%
4.57 3.15 1.07 1.31 1.60 0.69 2.23 1.50
[-2, +2] 4.32%*** 2.13%*** 66.23%* 1.37%** 0.66%* 61.54% 2.95%* 1.47%*
3.62 3.55 1.54 1.55 1.76 1.17 1.79 1.67
N 77 77 78 78
 Window Mean Median % Positive Mean Median % Positive Mean Median
[0] 1.64%** 0.82%*** 66.23%** 1.08%*** 0.30% 52.56% 0.56% 0.52%
5.12 3.13 1.95 2.70 1.29 0.43 0.47 1.28
[-1,  0] 2.28%*** 0.54%*** 64.94%** 2.47%*** 0.10% 53.85% -0.19% 0.44%*
2.31 3.00 2.18 4.19 0.48 0.20 -0.08 1.90
[0,  +1] 2.89%** 0.50%*** 64.94%* 1.71%*** 0.67%** 55.13% 1.18% -0.17%
6.05 3.16 1.48 3.37 2.20 0.75 0.82 -0.54
[-1, +1] 3.2%*** 0.86%*** 67.53%** 2.67%*** 0.04% 50.00% 0.53% 0.82%**
3.10 3.62 1.95 3.71 1.06 0.19 0.32 1.92
[-2, +2] 3.03%*** 1.66%*** 68.83%** 2.71%*** 0.54%* 55.13% 0.32% 1.12%
2.72 3.49 2.18 3.12 1.80 0.52 0.19 1.67
N 77 77 78 78
High Low
High Low
Panel B - CARs Around CEO Turnover Announcements by Board Structure








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Forced 1.0000
2 Board Size   -0.2184*** 1.0000
3 Staggered Board -0.0149 -0.0470 1.0000
4 IDTenure -0.0443 -0.0284 0.1093 1.0000
5 EBC 0.0012 0.0331 -0.0597 0.0985 1.0000
6 IDOwnership 0.1055   -0.2089*** 0.1881** 0.0863   -0.3730*** 1.0000
7 IOwnership 0.2206***  -0.2381*** -0.0234 0.0561 0.0986 -0.0241 1.0000
8 CEOOwnership 0.0523  -0.1458* -0.0216 -0.0329 -0.0586 -0.0782 -0.0315 1.0000
9 CEOTenure -0.1009 0.0814 0.0339 0.1570** 0.1141  -0.2200*** 0.1025 0.1830** 1.0000
10 Duality  -0.1989*** 0.1992*** 0.0503 0.0151 0.2182***  -0.4085*** -0.0145 0.1006  0.3423*** 1.0000
11 % ID 0.0561 0.1889** 0.0820 0.0356 -0.0388 0.1861** -0.0477  -0.2484***  -0.1493* -0.0409 1.0000
12 % IFIE 0.4041***  -0.2481*** 0.0442  -0.1633**  -0.1468* 0.2623*** 0.2343*** -0.0885 -0.1112  -0.1646* 0.2784*** 1.0000
13 Size 0.0532 0.2373***  -0.3043*** -0.1061 0.1163  -0.2906*** 0.0496  -0.1986*** -0.0223 0.0996 0.2590*** 0.0316 1.0000
***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Table 3. Pairwise correlations between independent variables
This table reports pairwise correlations between independent variables in OLS model (1). Forced is a forced turnover indicator that is equal to 1 if a
turnover is classified as forced and 0 otherwise. Board Size  is the number of directors on a bank board. Staggered Board  is an indicator that is equal to
1 if the directors are classified and 0 otherwise. IDTenure is the average tenure of independent directors. EBC is the ratio between independent
directors ’ equity-based compensation and total compensation. IDOwnership, IOwnership, and CEOOwnership are the percentages of shares
outstanding owned by independent directors as a group, institutional investors, and outgoing CEO and his (or her) immediate family, respectively.
CEOTenure is the tenure of an outgoing CEO. Duality is an indicator that is equal to 1 if there is CEO-chairman duality and 0 otherwise. %ID is the
percentage of independent directors on a bank board, while %IFIE is the percentage of independent financial industry experts on a bank board. Size  is




Table 4. Regression results for CARs around CEO turnover announcements 
This table reports regression results for OLS model (1). CARs are abnormal stock returns around 
bank CEO turnover announcements. ITS is the interaction terms: %ID*Forced and % 
IFIE*Forced. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered by bank. T-
statistics are reported in Italics.  F-test is against the null hypothesis that the coefficients of %IFIE 








***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.  
Forced 0.0216** -0.0373 0.0262* 0.0526 0.0311** -0.0883 0.0391** 0.0246 0.0270 -0.0042
2.12 -0.46 1.76 0.35 1.96 -0.88 2.26 0.24 1.54 -0.04
Board Size 0.0016 0.0017 0.0019 0.0023 0.0024* 0.0024* 0.0023 0.0025 0.0016 0.0018
1.32 1.27 0.87 0.92 1.66 1.74 1.41 1.50 1.02 1.09
Staggered Board 0.0085 0.0075 0.0198 0.0145 0.0177 0.0173 0.0183 0.0147 0.0036 0.0013
0.77 0.73 1.01 0.89 1.22 1.20 1.38 1.19 0.26 0.10
IDTenure -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0003 0.0012 0.0020
-1.01 -0.56 -0.24 0.25 -1.08 -0.58 -0.45 0.20 0.71 1.25
EBC 0.0121 0.0087 0.0003 0.0012 0.0392** 0.0325* 0.0293 0.0281 0.0211 0.0191
1.08 0.87 0.01 0.07 2.12 1.86 1.45 1.50 1.07 1.02
IDOwnership 0.1455 0.0938 0.4271 0.3714 -0.0528 -0.1363 0.1636 0.1041 0.0595 0.0075
1.32 0.75 1.36 1.19 -0.42 -0.78 0.97 0.65 0.28 0.04
IOwnership 0.0812 0.0939 0.1628 0.1595 0.0541 0.0793 0.0581 0.0626 0.0512 0.0586
0.69 0.81 0.69 0.73 0.44 0.63 0.38 0.45 0.38 0.47
CEOOwnership -0.0096 0.0005 -0.0410 -0.0319 -0.0634 -0.0465   -0.0997* -0.0891 -0.0240 -0.0144
-0.21 0.01 -0.59 -0.41 -1.10 -0.67 -1.75 -1.41 -0.29 -0.17
CEOTenure 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0008
0.10 0.07 -0.55 -0.58 -0.17 -0.18 -0.64 -0.69 -1.14 -1.15
Duality -0.0204 -0.0206 -0.0187 -0.0165 -0.0268 -0.0278 -0.0201 -0.0189  -0.0257*   -0.0252*
-1.36 -1.36 -1.30 -1.14 -1.25 -1.29 -1.42 -1.34 -1.89 -1.84
% ID -0.0757  -0.0806* -0.1899 -0.1356 -0.0396 -0.0635 -0.1190 -0.0893 -0.0669 -0.0531
-1.28 -1.83 -1.22 -1.53 -1.08 -1.46 -1.31 -1.45 -0.68 -0.74
% IFIE 0.1529** 0.0301 0.2025*** 0.0102 0.2082* 0.0257 0.1855*** 0.0086 0.1615*** 0.0190
1.92 0.82 2.70 0.15 1.65 0.52 2.81 0.17 2.56 0.33
Size 0.0059* 0.0054* 0.0120 0.0108 0.0041 0.0033 0.0066 0.0056 0.0058 0.0051
1.81 1.82 1.50 1.47 1.00 0.84 1.30 1.18 1.06 0.98
% ID * Forced 0.0421 -0.1131 0.1107 -0.0456 -0.0072
0.40 -0.51 0.98 -0.32 -0.05
% IFIE * Forced 0.2229* 0.3696*** 0.3256 0.3332*** 0.2649**
1.69 2.56 1.60 2.84 2.34
Intercept   -0.1179* -0.0962 -0.2047 -0.2081 -0.1049 -0.0625 -0.1201 -0.1109 -0.1177 -0.1042
-1.66 -1.38 -1.43 -1.21 -1.09 -0.82 -1.19 -1.02 -1.11 -0.89
F -test 2.14* 4.13** 1.52 4.83*** 3.75**
N 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
R-Squared 0.2041 0.2311 0.1535 0.1704 0.2110 0.2586 0.2014 0.2293 0.1408 0.1611




Table 5. Changes in return on assets (ROA) around CEO turnovers 
This table presents mean changes in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA (net income/the book 
value of total assets) in seven quarters before (-Q1 minus –Q7) and following (Q7 minus Q1) bank 
CEO turnovers for a sample of 124 successions from January 1st, 1995 to December 31st, 2010. 
Banks that announce M&As in the seven quarters either before or after the announced CEO 
turnover are excluded. Outgoing CEOs or successors who have held the CEO position for less 
than seven quarters are also excluded. T-statistics are reported in Italics. 
 
 































-Q7 to -Q1  -0.18%***  -0.44%*** -0.03%  -0.41%***  -0.03%** -0.44% 0.41%
-2.64 -3.45 -0.34 -3.01 -2.11 -1.58 0.87
Q1 to Q7 0.02% 0.31%***  -0.15%** 0.46%*** -0.15% 0.31%  -0.46%*
0.40 6.21 -2.40 5.08 -0.53 1.59 -1.86
-Q7 to -Q1  -0.15%**  -0.40%*** -0.01%  -0.39%***  -0.01%* -0.40% 0.39%
-2.24 -3.13 -0.08 -2.86 -1.70 -1.45 0.86
Q1 to Q7 0.03% 0.30%***  -0.13%** 0.43%***  -0.40%** 0.30%*  -0.70%*
0.60 6.18 -2.13 4.86 -0.36 1.74 -1.90


























-Q7 to -Q1  -0.30%* -0.01%  -0.68%*** 0.26% -0.29%  -0.94%*** 0.38%  -0.27%*
-1.72 -1.24 -4.18 0.78 -1.48 -2.78 1.43 -1.67
Q1 to Q7 0.20%***  -0.14%** 0.52%*** -0.23% 0.34%*** 0.75%***  -0.32%*** 0.09%
4.25 -2.01 5.47 -1.34 3.26 4.02 -3.34 0.56
-Q7 to -Q1 -0.26% -0.01%  -0.63%*** 0.27% -0.25%  -0.90%*** 0.37%  -0.28%*
-1.47 -0.89 -4.04 0.84 -1.33 -2.77 1.44 -1.63
Q1 to Q7 0.20%***  -0.12%* 0.50%*** -0.20% 0.32%*** 0.70%***  -0.30%*** 0.08%
4.24 -1.78 5.41 -1.21 3.08 3.93 -3.33 0.46
Industry-adjusted ROA:
Panel A - Change in ROA by Turnover Type or Successor Origin
Unadjusted ROA:
Industry-adjusted ROA:





Table 6. Changes in return on equity (ROE) around CEO turnovers 
This table presents mean changes in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROE (net income/the book 
value of equity) in seven quarters before (-Q1 minus –Q7) and following (Q7 minus Q1) bank 
CEO turnovers for a sample of 124 successions from January 1st, 1995 to December 31st, 2010. 
Banks that announce M&As in the seven quarters either before or after the announced CEO 
turnover are excluded. Outgoing CEOs or successors who have held the CEO position for less 
than seven quarters are also excluded. T-statistics are reported in Italics. 
 
 































-Q7 to -Q1  -3.62%***  -6.61%*** -1.81%  -4.80%*  -3.34%**  -4.50%* 1.16%
-2.72 -3.37 -1.03 -1.76 -2.15 -1.73 0.37
Q1 to Q7 -0.76% 3.73%***  -3.40%** 7.13%*** -1.45% 1.73% -3.18%
-0.68 3.92 -2.12 3.21 -1.09 1.01 -1.18
-Q7 to -Q1  -3.22%***  -6.08%*** -1.49%  -4.59%*  -2.99%** -3.97% 0.98%
-2.44 -3.13 -0.86 -1.70 -1.94 -1.55 0.32
Q1 to Q7 -0.61% 3.71%***  -3.16%** 6.87%*** -1.31% 1.91% -3.22%
-0.55 3.94 -1.97 3.11 -0.99 1.16 1.20


























-Q7 to -Q1  -4.56%* -2.79%  -10.10%*** 3.42% -1.77%  -13.52%*** 5.54% -6.21%
-1.72 -1.45 -3.80 0.81 -0.53 -2.86 1.38 1.29
Q1 to Q7 2.62%**  -3.36%* 6.01%*** -3.62% 5.98%** 9.63%***  -3.39%* 0.26%
2.15 -1.83 4.53 -1.27 2.13 3.27 -1.71 0.06
-Q7 to -Q1 -4.10% -2.49%  -9.47%*** 3.82% -1.61%  -13.29%*** 5.37% -6.31%
-1.56 -1.31 -3.59 0.93 -0.48 -2.86 1.35 -1.33
Q1 to Q7 2.59%**  -3.14%* 6.01%*** -3.23% 5.73%** 9.24%***  -3.42%* 0.09%
2.14 -1.71 4.67 -1.18 2.04 3.26 -1.75 0.02
Industry-adjusted ROE:
Panel A - Change in ROE by Turnover Type or Successor Origin
Unadjusted ROE:
Industry-adjusted ROE:





Table 7. Abnormal stock performance around CEO turnovers 
This table reports abnormal stock performance over various window in the pre- and post-turnover 
periods around the announcement quarter (Q0): [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], [-Q1], [+Q1], [+Q1, +Q4], 
[+Q1, +Q7].  Banks that announce M&As in seven quarters either before or after the announced 
CEO turnover are excluded.  Outgoing CEOs or successors who have held the CEO position for 
less than seven quarters are also excluded.  Stock returns are adjusted by a four factor model that 
includes the market risk premium (the spread between CRSP value-weighted market return and 
risk-free rate), SMB (the return spread between portfolios of small and big capitalization stocks), 
HML (the return spread between portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks), and a 
momentum factor.  The market model parameters are estimated with data over the 24-month 
period seven quarters before the turnover announcement quarter.  T-statistics are reported in Italics. 
 
 
***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
  


















[-Q7, -Q1]  -14.08%* -16.59% -12.61% -3.98% -7.92%  -34.74%*** 26.82%
-1.79 -1.57 -1.16 -0.24 -0.84 -2.82 1.44
[-Q4, -Q1]  -8.53%* -9.95% -7.71% -2.24% -4.91%  -20.69%*** 15.78%
-1.86 -1.26 -1.36 -0.24 -0.91 -2.52 1.45
[-Q1] 0.45% 1.93% -0.41% 2.34% 2.38% -6.05% 8.43%
0.19 0.38 -0.19 0.49 0.89 -1.36 1.54
[+Q1] -2.94% -0.52%  -4.33%*** 3.81%  -4.84%*** 3.67%  -8.51%*
-1.50 -0.12 -2.51 0.93 -2.78 0.58 -1.83
[+Q1, +Q4]  -2.83%** -5.32%  -10.84%*** 5.52%  -10.61%*** -2.66% -7.95%
-2.16 -0.65 -2.45 0.65 -2.55 -0.24 -0.81
[+Q1, +Q7]  -11.61%* -1.21%  -17.55%*** 16.34%  -15.35%*** 1.42% -16.77%
-1.83 -0.09 -2.66 1.24 -2.42 0.08 -1.10


























[-Q7, -Q1] -0.17% -11.38%  -46.36%*** -19.26% 11.21% -27.10% 46.19%** 7.88%
-0.01 -0.93 -3.52 -0.85 0.54 -1.09 2.18 0.26
[-Q4, -Q1] 1.95% -7.97%  -31.53%*** -6.25% 9.92% -25.28% 33.48%** -1.72%
0.19 -1.26 -3.16 -0.48 0.85 -1.56 2.11 -0.11
[-Q1] 9.09% -0.61% -11.05% 0.63% 9.70%* -11.68% 20.14%** -1.24%
1.37 -0.25 -1.58 0.15 1.68 -1.32 1.95 -0.20
[+Q1]  -6.85%*  -3.95%** 11.73%  -6.39%* -2.90% 18.12%  -18.58%** 2.44%
-1.91 -2.01 1.09 -2.06 -0.77 1.46 -2.03 0.51
[+Q1, +Q4]  -15.42%*  -8.46%* 14.31%  -23.75%** -6.96% 38.06%*  -29.73%* 15.29%
-1.88 -1.76 0.82 -2.13 -0.77 1.74 -1.76 1.26
[+Q1, +Q7] -16.81%  -14.70%** 28.94% -32.97% -2.11% 61.91%*  -45.75%* 18.27%
-1.19 -2.17 1.12 -1.54 -0.15 1.79 -1.70 1.00
Panel A - Abnormal Stock Performance by Turnover Type or Successor Origin




Table 8. Changes in bank risk-taking around CEO turnovers 
This table reports the z-score in the seven-quarter pre- and post-turnover periods as well as the 
change between the two.  The z-score is used to proxy bank risk-taking.  An increase (decrease) in 
the z-score implies a decrease (increase) in bank risk-taking.  T-statistics are reported in Italics. 
 
 
***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
  



















Pre-turnover 2.4398*** 2.4445*** 2.4369*** 0.0081 2.4837*** 2.3034*** 0.1803
39.99 20.68 36.12 0.06 36.60 17.14 1.27
Post-turnover 2.5699*** 2.6396*** 2.5278*** 0.1118 2.5657*** 2.5848*** -0.0191
48.47 30.69 37.55 1.02 40.84 27.87 -0.15
Change (Post - Pre) 0.1301** 0.1951 0.0909* 0.1042 0.0820* 0.2814 -0.1994
2.22 1.18 1.90 0.05 1.68 1.59 -0.49


























Pre-turnover 2.5400*** 2.4583*** 2.2872*** 2.3263*** 0.0817 -0.0391 0.2528 0.1320
17.74 32.79 11.13 15.01 0.56 -0.14 1.04 0.72
Post-turnover 2.6505*** 2.5247*** 2.6166*** 2.5451*** 0.1258 0.0715 0.0339 -0.0204
22.52 34.15 25.36 15.07 0.94 0.38 0.18 -0.11
Change (Post - Pre) 0.1105 0.0664* 0.3294 0.2188 0.0441 0.1106 -0.2189 -0.1524
0.64 1.65 1.27 0.93 0.22 0.06 -0.43 -0.26
Panel A - Z-score  by Turnover Type or Successor Origin




Table 9. Regression analysis of the determinants of post-turnover performance 
This table reports regression results for OLS model (2). PC is performance change over the seven-
quarter post-turnover period, including changes in unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA and 
ROE, abnormal stock performance, and change in the z-score. Out is an outsider succession 
indicator that is equal to 1 if a successor CEO is an outsider and 0 otherwise.  Crisis is a financial 
crisis indicator variable that is equal to 1 for year 1998 (the LTCM crisis) and years 2007-2010 
(the recent financial crisis). I control for the percentage change (Control) in total assets (equity) 
for ROA (ROE) specifications because the change in ROA (ROE) may partially derive from the 
change in total assets (equity).  Other variables are defined as in model (1). F-test is against the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of %IFIE and %IFE*Forced are jointly zero. T-statistics are 









   
Table 9. Cont'd
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Forced 0.0049*** 0.0019 0.0047*** 0.0012 0.0937*** 0.1361 0.0910*** 0.1278 0.2794* -0.0508 0.0778 -0.5216
3.89 0.49 3.82 0.30 3.42 1.03 3.34 0.96 1.79 -0.06 0.50 -0.71
Out 0.0015* 0.0016* 0.0015* 0.0016* 0.0214 0.0279 0.0220 0.0283 0.2149 0.1931 0.0642 0.0730
1.75 1.80 1.80 1.83 1.04 1.31 1.08 1.34 1.18 1.09 0.42 0.47
Board Size 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0016 0.0012 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0115 -0.0125
0.59 0.59 0.46 0.43 0.86 1.07 0.76 0.95 -0.01 -0.07 -0.55 -0.58
Staggered Board -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0123 -0.0213 -0.0097 -0.0183 0.1842 0.2138 -0.0857 -0.0955
-1.32 -1.46 -1.16 -1.26 -0.79 -1.09 -0.64 -0.94 1.33 1.49 -0.41 -0.46
IDTenure -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0219 -0.0255 0.0100 0.0229
-0.54 -0.04 -0.52 -0.01 -0.79 -0.33 -0.81 -0.35 -1.16 -1.30 0.49 1.12
EBC -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0560 0.0534 0.0588 0.0560 -0.1548 -0.1655  -0.5451*   -0.6006**
-0.19 -0.44 -0.06 -0.34 1.12 1.03 1.17 1.07 -0.73 -0.81 -1.87 -2.06
IDOwnership -0.0065 -0.0111 -0.0049 -0.0097 0.1029 0.0135 0.1191 0.0290 -1.7225 -1.5860 -2.0860  -2.7931*
-0.71 0.00 -0.55 -1.00 0.48 0.07 0.56 0.14 -1.23 -1.11 -1.42 -1.65
IOwnership -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0059 -0.0055 -0.2206 -0.2400 -0.2269 -0.2453 -1.0279 -0.9435 -1.0475 -1.0859
-0.70 -0.64 -0.84 -0.76 -1.14 -1.13 -1.18 -1.15 -1.17 -1.05 -0.93 -0.99
CEOOwnership   -0.0063*  -0.0060**   -0.0065**  -0.0062**   -0.1383**   -0.1419**   -0.1389**   -0.1421** 1.3116* 1.3429*   -0.9962** -0.9253
-1.77 -2.03 -1.94 -2.21 -2.03 -2.13 -2.07 -2.16 1.70 1.66 -1.97 -1.46
CEOTenure 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0034
0.54 0.45 0.49 0.41 -0.53 -0.85 -0.62 -0.94 -0.37 -0.28 -0.21 -0.41
Duality 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0250 0.0299 0.0224 0.0270 0.1119 0.0938 0.2117 0.2089
1.27 1.28 1.18 1.18 0.83 1.03 0.75 0.93 0.70 0.57 1.38 1.49
% ID -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0032 -0.0038 -0.0800 -0.0284 -0.0779 -0.0294 0.2219 -0.0024 -0.2929 -0.4126
-0.64 -0.59 -0.66 -0.66 -0.63 -0.18 -0.62 -0.19 0.38 0.00 -0.47 -0.54
% IFIE 0.0054 -0.0023 0.0049 -0.0028 -0.0022 -0.1776 -0.0078 -0.1834 -0.5039 -0.1831 -0.6978   -2.1509**
0.95 -0.32 0.90 -0.40 -0.02 -1.00 -0.06 -1.03 -0.71 -0.28 -0.85 -2.14
Size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0015 0.0037 0.0023 0.0397 0.0436 0.0104 0.0087
-0.04 -0.09 0.14 0.10 0.44 0.21 0.55 0.32 0.81 0.86 0.18 0.15
Crisis   -0.0028**   -0.0029**   -0.0028**   -0.0029**   -0.0679**   -0.0693**   -0.0679**   -0.0692**   -0.3553**  -0.3497** 0.1135 0.1276
-2.09 -2.16 -2.18 -2.26 -2.37 -2.39 -2.39 -2.40 -2.12 -2.08 0.64 0.74
% ID * Forced 0.001 0.0015 -0.160 -0.151 0.6993 0.1232
0.09 0.23 -0.78 -0.74 0.65 0.10
% IFIE * Forced 0.0177** 0.0177** 0.4545** 0.4524** -0.9691 3.5844**
2.05 2.09 2.06 2.05 -0.64 2.29
Change in Assets 0.0023 0.0025 0.0029 0.0031
1.03 1.14 1.31 1.44
Change in Equity 0.1397*** 0.1398*** 0.1415*** 0.1416***
2.95 3.00 3.02 3.08
Intercept 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0664 -0.0613 -0.0789 -0.0728 -0.9836 -0.9210 0.4629 0.6629
0.04 0.16 -0.10 0.04 -0.46 -0.42 -0.56 -0.51 -0.89 -0.80 0.35 0.50
F -test 3.11** 3.17** 2.71* 2.69* 0.37 2.95**
N 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 113 113 111 111
















Table 10. Regression results for an alternative definition of board independence 
This table presents empirical results where board independence is defined as the ratio between the 
number of outside directors and board size.  Panel A reports regression results for OLS model (3). 
Panel B reports regression results for OLS model (4).  ODTenure is the average tenure of outside 
directors). ODEBC is equity-based compensation of outside directors. ODOwnership is the 
ownership of outside directors as a group. %OD is the ratio between outside directors and board 
size. %OFIE is the ratio between outside financial industry experts and board size. Other variables 
are defined as in models (1) and (2). F-test is against the null hypothesis that the coefficients 















Table 10. Cont’d 
 
  
Forced 0.0203** -0.0455 0.0230* 0.0191 0.0317** -0.1549 0.0386** -0.0397 0.0268 -0.0508
2.01 -0.57 1.68 0.16 2.01 -1.37 2.30 -0.49 1.56 -0.54
Board Size 0.0021 0.0021 0.0026 0.0029 0.0029* 0.0026* 0.0029* 0.0029* 0.0022 0.0022
1.61 1.54 1.15 1.13 1.82 1.82 1.75 1.72 1.38 1.28
Staggered Board 0.0117 0.0083 0.0264 0.0182 0.0214 0.0190 0.0248* 0.0196 0.0091 0.0053
1.06 0.88 1.24 1.07 1.51 1.48 1.80 1.53 0.61 0.38
ODTenure -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0020
-1.02 -0.46 -0.53 0.10 -1.18 -0.60 -0.88 -0.17 0.63 1.27
ODEBC 0.0122 0.0086 -0.0001 -0.0011 0.0404** 0.0309* 0.0301 0.0257 0.0210 0.0168
1.07 0.75 0.00 -0.06 2.18 1.70 1.46 1.24 1.04 0.80
ODOwnership 0.1214 0.0714 0.3311 0.2469 -0.0225 -0.0906 0.1351 0.0633 0.0392 -0.0183
1.58 0.79 1.60 1.47 -0.20 -0.59 1.25 0.71 0.25 -0.14
IOwnership 0.0717 0.0788 0.1544 0.1555 0.0435 0.0631 0.0525 0.0610 0.0443 0.0527
0.63 0.70 0.65 0.67 0.38 0.55 0.35 0.41 0.33 0.40
CEOOwnership -0.0327 -0.0167 -0.0974 -0.0738 -0.0825 -0.0577  -0.1472**  -0.1247* -0.0589 -0.0404
-0.63 -0.28 -1.09 -0.77 -1.32 -0.74 -2.19 -1.74 -0.61 -0.40
CEOTenure 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0009
0.22 0.02 -0.41 -0.58 -0.10 -0.28 -0.51 -0.73 -1.16 -1.32
Duality -0.0196 -0.0193 -0.0179 -0.0179 -0.0257 -0.0246 -0.0192 -0.0188  -0.0257*  -0.0253*
-1.33 -1.31 -1.28 -1.20 -1.21 -1.21 -1.38 -1.40 -1.89 -1.84
% OD   -0.0967* -0.0877** -0.2205  -0.1526*  -0.0719* -0.1075**  -0.1654**-0.1444*** -0.1174  -0.1079*
-1.87 -2.11 -1.52 -1.94 -1.72 -2.35 -2.09 -2.77 -1.24 -1.72
% OFIE 0.1662** 0.0252 0.2443*** 0.0012 0.1898* 0.0031 0.1895*** -0.0139 0.1666*** 0.0047
2.25 0.85 2.78 0.02 1.63 0.08 2.91 -0.36 2.54 0.09
Size 0.0049* 0.0039* 0.0091* 0.0074* 0.0038 0.0027 0.0052 0.0038 0.0051 0.0041
1.90 1.81 1.73 1.68 0.96 0.74 1.30 1.05 1.18 1.03
% OD * Forced 0.0269 -0.0942 0.1637 0.0176 0.0337
0.29 -0.52 1.49 0.15 0.26
% OFIE * Forced 0.2689** 0.4725*** 0.3479* 0.3893*** 0.3084***
2.02 2.71 1.72 3.39 2.53
Intercept -0.0829 -0.0559 -0.1087 -0.1031 -0.0821 -0.0089 -0.0483 -0.0155 -0.0669 -0.0352
-1.25 -1.02 -1.10 -0.99 -0.81 -0.11 -0.52 -0.17 -0.70 -0.36
F -test 3.35** 4.31*** 1.67 6.34*** 4.00**
N 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
R-Squared 0.2223 0.2643 0.1665 0.2008 0.2148 0.4784 0.2203 0.2695 0.1540 0.1892
Panel A - Event Study 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Forced 0.0056*** -0.0005 0.0053*** -0.0002 0.1018*** 0.1049 0.0983*** 0.1125 0.3364** 0.6702 0.1311 -1.1359
3.85 -0.09 3.76 -0.04 3.59 0.59 3.50 0.63 2.22 0.50 0.81 -1.21
Out 0.0017** 0.0018** 0.0017** 0.0018** 0.0216 0.0276 0.0220 0.0285 0.2251 0.2157 0.0452 0.0458
1.96 1.98 1.99 2.08 1.06 1.33 1.09 1.39 1.38 1.52 0.30 0.30
Board Size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0162 -0.0171
0.18 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.35 0.10 0.31 -0.26 -0.26 -0.77 -0.79
Staggered Board -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0115 -0.0172 -0.0093 -0.0154 0.2187 0.2267 -0.0516 -0.0377
-0.93 -0.95 -0.79 -0.84 -0.71 -0.88 -0.59 -0.80 1.53 1.46 -0.24 -0.17
IDTenure -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0039 -0.0027 -0.0039 -0.0026 -0.0340  -0.0394* 0.0109 0.0229
-1.27 -0.71 -1.23 -0.64 -1.17 -0.78 -1.17 -0.77 -1.59 -1.68 0.53 1.08
EBC -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0552 0.0497 0.0583 0.0531 -0.1461 -0.1128  -0.5704*  -0.6599**
-0.25 -0.62 -0.11 -0.50 1.09 0.93 1.15 0.99 -0.71 -0.56 -1.91 -2.23
IDOwnership -0.0031 -0.0077 -0.0018 -0.0064 0.0955 0.0211 0.1100 0.0350 -1.3887 -1.0888 -1.8575  -2.4537*
-0.41 -1.06 -0.24 -0.91 0.50 0.12 0.58 0.20 -1.03 -0.78 -1.41 -1.75
IOwnership -0.0041 -0.0038 -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.2123 -0.2188 -0.2197 -0.2271 -0.9129 -0.9199 -0.8475 -0.8511
-0.59 -0.55 -0.74 -0.71 -1.09 -1.07 -1.13 -1.11 -1.00 -0.98 -0.73 -0.74
CEOOwnership  -0.0089**  -0.0085**  -0.0089**  -0.0086**  -0.1533*  -0.1583**  -0.1517*  -0.1581** 1.1795 1.1618  -1.2609**  -1.1741*
-1.96 -2.31 -2.06 -2.47 -1.90 -2.16 -1.93 -2.20 1.54 1.50 -2.23 -1.66
CEOTenure 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0024 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0045
0.74 0.56 0.68 0.50 -0.28 -0.58 -0.39 -0.71 -0.32 -0.22 -0.20 -0.57
Duality 0.0021 0.0021 0.0019 0.0019 0.0260 0.0275 0.0234 0.0251 0.1097 0.1089 0.2038 0.1981
1.23 1.25 1.16 1.18 0.81 0.90 0.73 0.83 0.69 0.68 1.29 1.33
% ID -0.0059 -0.0070 -0.0055 -0.0064 -0.0319 -0.0147 -0.0282 -0.0068 0.0412 0.1153 -0.5299 -0.9176
-1.47 -1.33 -1.39 -1.24 -0.27 -0.09 -0.24 -0.04 0.07 0.18 -0.75 -1.14
% IFIE -0.0032  -0.0115* -0.0031  -0.0116* -0.1039  -0.2552** -0.1003  -0.2535**  -1.2622* -0.6840 -1.1368  -2.5389***
-0.62 -1.80 -0.63 -1.88 -1.00 -2.28 -0.97 -2.27 -1.75 -1.05 -1.39 -3.00
Size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0019 0.0008 0.0037 0.0014 0.0495 0.0517 0.0182 0.0158
0.12 0.01 0.32 0.16 0.34 0.13 0.47 0.23 1.12 1.09 0.33 0.29
Crisis  -0.0027**  -0.0026**  -0.0027**  -0.0026**  -0.0684**  -0.0663**  -0.0685**  -0.0664**  -0.3479**  -0.3635** 0.1059 0.1526
-2.00 -2.04 -2.09 -2.13 -2.32 -2.26 -2.34 -2.28 -2.14 -2.21 0.61 0.92
% ID * Forced 0.004 0.0027 -0.091 -0.107 -0.1152 0.8881
0.47 0.37 -0.4 -0.47 -0.06 0.66
% IFIE * Forced 0.0189** 0.0196*** 0.3925** 0.4015** -1.4151 3.2960**
2.39 2.55 2.33 2.44 -0.9 2.17
Change in Assets 0.0019 0.0059 0.0025 0.0029
0.09 0.71 1.21 1.33
Change in Equity 0.1361*** 0.1344*** 0.1381*** 0.1362***
3.08 3.13 3.16 3.20
Intercept 0.0035 0.0059 0.0022 0.0044 -0.0347 -0.0125 -0.0502 -0.0299 -0.8516 -0.9987 0.6144 1.0903
0.46 0.71 0.29 0.56 -0.27 -0.09 -0.39 -0.23 -0.80 -0.86 0.50 0.87
F -test 2.86* 3.24** 3.12** 3.26** 1.37 4.75***
N 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 113 113 111 111
R-Squared 0.3479 0.3859 0.3405 0.3818 0.3655 0.3875 0.3650 0.3881 0.2610 0.2722 0.1375 0.2034
Change in the
z-score















Table 11.  Regression results for annual return on assets, annual return on equity, and 
annualized stock return volatility 
This table reports regression results for model (5) where PC is the changes in annual unadjusted 
and industry-adjusted ROA and ROE, and annualized stock return volatility.  Other variables are 
defined as in the previous models.  Industry median ROA and ROE are calculated from the banks 
covered by COMPUSTAT.  Observations where the successor CEO does not survive till the end of 
year two (with the turnover year being year 0) are excluded.  Banks announce M&As in these two 
years are also excluded.  Year fixed effect is controlled and standard errors are clustered by bank.  
F-test is against the null hypothesis that the coefficients on %IFIE and %IFIE*Forced are jointly 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Forced 0.0106** 0.0096 0.0106** 0.0096 0.0082 -0.2947 0.0085 -0.2953 -0.3777** -0.9819
1.96 0.40 1.96 0.40 0.05 -0.46 0.05 -0.46 -2.32 -1.57
Out -0.0075 -0.0077 -0.0075 -0.0077 -0.3712 -0.3880 -0.3713 -0.3881 -0.1255 -0.1498
-0.86 -0.89 -0.87 -0.89 -1.18 -1.21 -1.18 -1.21 -0.87 -1.07
Board Size 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0060 0.0073 0.0060 0.0073 0.0143 0.0095
1.42 1.51 1.41 1.50 0.39 0.48 0.39 0.48 1.29 0.78
Staggered Board 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.2368 -0.2904 -0.2369 -0.2904 -0.0419 0.0297
0.33 -0.03 0.33 -0.03 -1.05 -1.18 -1.05 -1.18 -0.44 0.28
IDTenure -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0498 0.0621 0.0498 0.0621 0.0258* 0.0154
-1.03 -0.63 -1.04 -0.63 1.41 1.50 1.41 1.50 1.74 1.10
EBC 0.0127 0.0125 0.0127 0.0125 -0.0867 -0.0989 -0.0868 -0.0990 -0.0914 -0.1024
1.44 1.36 1.44 1.36 -0.39 -0.43 -0.39 -0.43 -0.45 -0.48
IDOwnership -0.0305 -0.0384 -0.0306 -0.0385 2.0163 1.4391 2.0159 1.4388 -0.8385 -0.3192
-0.43 -0.53 -0.43 -0.53 1.23 0.88 1.23 0.88 -0.68 -0.27
IOwnership -0.0219 -0.0235 -0.0219 -0.0235 0.0552 0.0325 0.0552 0.0326 0.2140 0.4065
-0.60 -0.62 -0.60 -0.62 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.34 0.58
CEOOwnership 0.0059 0.0021 0.0059 0.0021 -0.5293 -0.7584 -0.5292 -0.7582 0.0277 0.0831
0.60 0.26 0.60 0.26 -0.74 -0.95 -0.74 -0.95 0.08 0.17
CEOTenure 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0028 0.0016 0.0034
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.37 -0.32 -0.37 -0.32 0.25 0.53
Duality 0.0016 0.0022 0.0016 0.0022 0.2407 0.2536 0.2406 0.2535 0.0606 0.0257
0.39 0.50 0.38 0.49 1.21 1.32 1.21 1.32 0.43 0.20
% ID -0.0028 0.0035 -0.0028 0.0035 0.4014 0.6621 0.4018 0.6618 0.2955 -0.2513
-0.25 0.25 -0.25 0.25 0.96 1.16 0.96 1.16 0.56 -0.42
% IFIE 0.0488* 0.0245 0.0487* 0.0245 0.3481 -0.9679 0.3473 -0.9677 0.5131 1.7064*
1.91 0.80 1.91 0.80 0.48 -0.83 0.48 -0.83 0.67 1.71
Size 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 0.0011 0.0142 0.0230 0.0142 0.0230 0.0745** 0.0804***
0.84 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.35 0.54 0.35 0.54 2.38 2.53
% ID * Forced -0.013 -0.0128 -0.3335 -0.3318 1.5781
-0.42 -0.41 -0.32 -0.31 1.40
% IFIE * Forced 0.0627** 0.0626** 3.3888 3.386  -3.1441**
2.01 2.01 1.54 1.54 -2.11
Change in Assets 0.0135 0.0138 0.0135 0.0138
1.06 1.08 1.06 1.08
Change in Equity -1.8933 -1.8372 -1.8935 -1.8375
-1.00 -0.97 -1.00 -0.97
Intercept -0.0325 -0.0466 -0.0330 -0.0471 -1.3791 -2.0944 -1.3829 -2.0976  -2.8607***  -2.5052***
-1.13 -1.55 -1.14 -1.57 -1.22 -1.49 -1.22 -1.49 -3.78 -3.36
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F -test 4.92*** 4.91*** 1.46 0.96 2.32*
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 113 113















Appendix B: Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Median industry-adjusted return on assets around CEO turnovers by turnover 














-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Quarter Relative to Turnover
All Turnovers Insider Successions Outsider Successions





















Figure 2. Median Industry-adjusted return on assets around CEO turnovers by turnover 
type and successor origin 
 
 
Figure 3. Median industry-adjusted return on equity around CEO turnovers by turnover 
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Figure 4. Median Industry-adjusted return on equity around CEO turnovers by turnover 
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